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Abstract

This thesis explores impediments to regime change using the strategy of nonviolent
action, through an integrated examination of consensual power theory as articulated by
Gene Sharp and Antonio Gramsci, and by incorporating James Scott’s theory that
observable consent in the public discourse can belie a private realm of resistance to a
system of domination. Using the context of the 2011 Libyan uprising, this thesis
analyses the reality of consensual power in Libya to explain what factors precluded
nonviolent action succeeding in the 2011 revolution.

Critically evaluating the theories, this study examines a wide range of information
about the historical, political, economic and social power structures of Libya and the
significance of these factors in the 2011 Libyan revolution. By clearly elucidating the
internal dynamics of the Libyan system, this thesis argues that domination and not
consent served as the primary source of political power for Qadhafi’s revolutionary
regime and thus Sharp’s strategy of withdrawing consent does not fit the reality of
Libya. Additionally, consent must be understood as a vastly more complex
phenomenon if nonviolent strategy is to be successful in the future.
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Introduction

The four-decade-long revolutionary rule of ‘Brother Leader’ Muammar Qadhafi ended
on 20 October 2011 when after a protracted eight-month civil war he was killed at the
hands of his own people (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2011b). In early 2011
nonviolent protests swept Tunisia and Egypt overthrowing the long-standing
dictatorships of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak. While Libya appeared next
in line to oust an entrenched dictator using nonviolent action, the strategy could not be
sustained and swiftly deteriorated into violent conflict. Although the revolutions in
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and subsequent uprisings, have been collectively termed the
‘Arab Spring’, this terminology belies profound differences in internal dynamics and
grievances that sparked the protests (Anderson, 2011). This study will be examining how
Libya’s historical context and contemporary situation led to a violent outcome in the
2011 uprising – a vastly different result to the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia.

Libya has a long history of foreign domination: subjugation to the Ottoman Empire from
1551 for nearly four centuries, then Italian colonialism from 1911 for another three
decades (Anderson, 1983; Ahmida, 2009). After Mussolini’s Fascist regime lost Libya
during World War II, the country was placed under British and French administration
from 1942-51. Thereupon the United Kingdom of Libya was declared on 24 December
1951 uniting the provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fazzan under the monarchical
rule of Idris al-Sanusi, who claimed legitimacy as heir to the Sanusiya religious
movement (Davis, 1987; Vandewalle, 2006). During the first decade of independence
Libya overwhelmingly relied on foreign aid for its survival, but with the
commercialisation of oil in the early 1960s Libya transformed into a super-prosperous
nation (Naur, 1986; St John, 2008). Nevertheless, with political activities proscribed, and
with substantial oil revenues placing immense strain on kinship as the sole mechanism
for economic distribution, politically disenfranchised Libyans began demanding change
(Vandewalle, 1995; St John, 2011).

On 1 September 1969 the revolutionary regime of Muammar Qadhafi usurped the
monarchy’s power and imposed a socialist system of government (Bearman, 1986; ElKikhia, 1997). While the Colonel initially garnered popular support through Islamic
rhetoric, symbolic gestures of national independence, and charisma, his increasingly
radical interpretation of Islam alienated the Libyan people (Takeyh, 2000; St John,
1

2011). Through extensive oil revenues the revolutionary regime implemented an
idiosyncratic political and economic system of ‘direct democracy’ in which political
authority was ostensibly vested in the Libyan people but in reality sole power was
conferred upon Qadhafi (Vandewalle, 2008). From the 1980s to the early twenty-first
century Libya was a pariah state in which declining oil prices, combined with trade
sanctions over Qadhafi’s alleged support for global terrorism, reduced the regime’s
ability to pacify its citizenry (St John, 2011). Following the regime’s renunciation of
weapons of mass destruction in December 2003 Qadhafi embarked upon further
economic reforms but failed to generate support among an alienated, apathetic population
(Vandewalle, 2008). The regime’s 2011 downfall highlights an opportunity to analyse
the internal dynamics of the Libyan system, investigate what motivated an apparently
apathetic population to rebel, and examine why nonviolent resistance proved insufficient
to effect change.

Gene Sharp is considered “the father of nonviolent struggle” (CNN, 25 June 2012) and is
the world’s foremost expert on nonviolent revolution (Christian Science Monitor [CSM],
16 June 1986; Martin, 1989; BBC News, 21 February 2011). The 84 year-old American
academic has devoted most of his life to the study of nonviolence, for which he received
a Nobel Peace Prize nomination in 2009 (BBC News, 21 February 2011; New York
Times [NYT], 16 February 2011). While Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr
are synonymous with nonviolence, Sharp has theorised nonviolent technique for
application within wide-ranging contexts. The central tenet of Sharp’s work is that rulers’
power is derived from the consent of subjects, and that withdrawing consent using
nonviolent techniques diminishes that power (Sharp, 1973; BBC News, 21 February
2011). Sharp’s nonviolent strategy is credited with inspiring global uprisings from
Thailand, Indonesia, Bosnia and Zimbabwe, to the downfall of the Milosevic regime in
Serbia, and propelling the Eastern European revolutions of the early 2000s (BBC, 21
February 2011; NYT, 16 February 2011). More recently, Sharp’s scholarship is believed
to have been a major influence for the 2011 Arab Spring, particularly in Tunisia and
Egypt (NYT, 16 February 2011; CNN, 25 June 2012).

Another prominent political theorist of consensually based power is Antonio Gramsci,
the twentieth-century Italian philosopher who was imprisoned under Mussolini’s fascist
regime from 1926 until his death in 1937 (Forgacs, 1999). While imprisoned Gramsci
wrote the Prison Notebooks where he developed his theory of hegemony, arguing that
2

the dominant group in society maintains dominance through the ‘spontaneous consent’ of
subordinate groups: such consent is not based purely on economic interests nor force and
coercion but is rather reliant upon political and ideological consensus (Bates, 1975;
Jackson Lears, 1985).

In contrast James Scott questions consensual power by focusing on how subordinate
groups resist domination. In Scott’s view, understanding systems of domination cannot
solely rely on examining interactions between the dominant and subordinate groups in
the public discourse, but must also incorporate offstage forms of resistance to be
discovered in the subordinate group’s private world (Scott, 1985, 1990). Scott argues that
subaltern groups have not consented to domination, which can be evidenced through
everyday forms of resistance. This paper will be drawing on Gramsci and Scott’s theories
to examine Sharp’s theory of nonviolent action.

While nonviolent action has proven successful within a variety of contexts, such as
Tunisia and Egypt, the strategy could not penetrate the situation in Libya where violent
conflict eventually liberated Libyans from the seemingly inexorable Qadhafi regime.
Libya’s 2011 uprising thus provides a prime opportunity to explore impediments to
regime change using the strategy of nonviolent action. The analytical framework for this
thesis will comprise a study of the prominent political theorists introduced above: Sharp,
Gramsci and Scott will provide an integrated approach to examining consensually based
power in relation to nonviolent technique. The 2011 Libyan revolution then provides the
context in which to explore the reality of consensual power, where potential limitations
of nonviolent action will be identified. As Ruth First eloquently stated after Qadhafi
came to power:

There is no denying the special cast given the Libyan revolution by the
idiosyncratic character of Mu’ammar Gadafi…[but] to explain Libya by the
temperament, eccentricity, even instability of Gadafi is to make no meaningful
explanation in terms of history and Libyan society…while this might help in
explaining Gadafi, what explains the Libyan response to him. (First, 1974,
p. 20)
Consequently, taking into account First’s point and considering the space necessary to
adequately discuss the Libyan system’s complexity, that the original intention to devote a
chapter of this paper to analysing Qadhafi’s character through political psychology has
been sequestered for discussion at a time when there is ample scope to do the topic
3

justice. Similarly while Arab nationalism, Qadhafi’s foreign policy exploits, and the
impact of international sanctions have contributed to Libya’s internal situation, these
areas will only be explored where necessary for contextualisation due to the size
constraints of this dissertation.

Plato once stated “I may assume that your silence gives consent” (Jowett, 2011, p. 39).
However, does not such an assumption underestimate the ambiguity of silence? Thus
determining the truth of this statement informs a fundamental argument of this thesis –
what is the meaning of that silence? While overt expressions of dissent were highly
unusual in Libya, to purport that behavioural or perceived active ideological support in
the public discourse is indicative of consent underestimates the population’s private
realm of dialogue, where everyday modest and usually anonymous acts could provide
evidence against the assumption that silence gives consent. The primary concern of this
thesis is to examine the Libyan people’s response (both overt and covert) to Libya’s
power structures, explaining what factors precluded nonviolent action during the 2011
Libyan revolution and how these factors reflect on Gene Sharp’s theory.

This thesis contends that contrary to Sharp’s assumption that consent is always the basis
of political power, in accord with Gramsci where consent fails domination serves as the
primary source of political power supporting Scott’s assertion that apparent consent in
the public discourse can actually disguise resistance to domination. Qadhafi’s system of
‘direct democracy’ was in reality a façade behind which the Colonel ultimately
controlled Libyan power structures leaving most Libyans powerless and apathetic, which
became the breeding ground of violence. Once consent failed Qadhafi ruled Libya
through a system of domination in which the Libyan citizenry was left politically and
economically alienated, socially fragmented, with any opposition suppressed by a
pervasive security apparatus. Thus it will be demonstrated, using the Libyan context, that
the effectiveness of nonviolent action is limited where consent is not the underlying
source of power, and that consent is a vastly more complex phenomenon than asserted by
Sharp.

This thesis is divided into this introduction, four chapters, and a conclusion. The first
chapter includes a literature review and discusses the major ideas of the three theorists.
Through the theoretical framework of consensual power, chapters two and three will
examine a history of consent and structures of domination in Libya. Chapter four will
4

culminate in a discussion of the 2011 Libyan uprising’s nodes of violence. Findings and
recommendations regarding consensual power and the effectiveness of nonviolent action
will be presented in the conclusion.

5

Chapter One:

Historiography and theory
“Libya is a difficult country to know, let alone analyse”
(Cited in First, 1974, p. 24)

Making sense of modern Libya has proven challenging for scholars due to its tightly
controlled institutions and scarcity of data, not to mention the Qadhafi regime’s
contradictory directives. Vandewalle claimed, “no analyst has ever figured out precisely
how the system works” (1986, p. 34). Nevertheless, a select group of authors have
produced well-researched, comprehensive accounts of the Libyan system’s internal
dynamics. The following sources have provided invaluable context for an understanding
of Libya’s contemporary situation. To understand Libya one must explore its historical
roots based on Islam and the tribe. Evans-Pritchard (1949) provides a deep-historical
analysis of the Islamic Sanusiya Order’s developmental history from its absorption into
the Bedouin tribal structure to its transformation into a political organization.
Additionally, Ahmida (2009) explains how Sufi Islam and tribal military organization
fuelled the resistance against colonialism, and how the political and cultural legacy of
resistance strengthened Libyan attachment to Islam. Both Anderson (1986) and Davis
(1987) document the strength and resilience of the tribal system from integration into the
Ottoman Empire to revival under Italian control.

Around the theme of contradiction, First (1974) studied Libya from 1969-73 during four
visits in the immediate post-revolution period, highlighting the regime’s contradictions
such as using fundamentalist religion to create socialist revolution. El-Kikhia (1997)
concentrates on Libya’s political system ostensibly controlled by the Libyan people but
actually dominated by Qadhafi using chaos and turbulence to ensure the regime’s
survival. St John (2008, 2011) too focuses on contradiction, initially tracing the
development of the revolutionary state and then emphasising the inconsistency between
its rhetoric of ‘direct democracy’ and day-to-day life in Libya. Vandewalle’s (1995,
2008) edited works from a select group of academics provides insight into Libya’s
political, economic and social organization from its earliest history, to independence,
through to the 1969 revolution and beyond.

6

Libya’s political and economic development, were dominated by massive oil revenues
under both the Sanusiya monarchy and Qadhafi regime, leading to the neglect of modern
state institutions as ideological aspirations were instead pursued. Allen (1981) provides a
detailed historical analysis of Libya’s economic situation prior to oil, and how the
discovery of oil impacted on Libya’s political and economic development. Additionally,
Vandewalle (1998) examines Libya’s lack of institutional growth since independence
arguing that Libya was a ‘distributive state’ in which economic largesse was favoured at
the expense of institutional expansion and economic sustainability.

Of central importance to this research are three empirical studies conducted in Libya over
four decades 1. El Fathaly and Palmer (1980) evaluate the regime’s mobilization and
modernization efforts in the four years after the 1969 revolution concluding the regime’s
goals were not achieved. Obeidi (2001) analyses how the regime’s ideology influenced
the political beliefs, values and attitudes of Libya’s younger generation, concluding
significantly that the regime was neither successful in developing politically active
citizens nor in cultivating an alternative social base to the tribal system. While AlWerfalli (2011) examines the extent and effect of political alienation in Libya, in which
common behaviours such as apathy and violence are linked to the depoliticization of the
Libyan population.

While the 2011 Libyan revolution was widely reported, the primary source materials
were chiefly gathered online from reputable news media such as the BBC News, the
Christian Science Monitor, the New York Times and Amnesty International News. The
news reports assist in examining the Libyan uprising’s initial nonviolence and the extent
of the subsequent violent conflict. Additionally, news reports provide insight into recent
events that fuelled the insurrection; elucidates the role of the tribes and military during
2011; and describes Qadhafi’s responses. The newspaper accounts also allow for basic
comparison between the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions that preceded the situation in
Libya.

1

El Fathaly and Palmer collected information using questionnaires and personal interviews with the
population of Zawia province in 1973 (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980). Obeidi’s study is based on research
conducted in 1994 with male and female students at the University of Garyounis in Benghazi (Obeidi,
2001). In 2001 Al-Werfalli conducted a survey and interviews with residents of the Al-Orouba quarter in
Benghazi (Al-Werfalli, 2011).
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Gene Sharp has written extensively on nonviolence originating with his 1951 masters
thesis Nonviolence: A Sociological Study, to his 1968 doctoral dissertation The Politics of
Nonviolent Action: A Study in the Control of Political Power. Sharp’s seminal 1973 work
The Politics of Nonviolent Action articulates his theory on the nature and control of
political power and catalogues 198 methods of nonviolent action into three broad
categories: protest and persuasion; noncooperation; and nonviolent intervention,
providing central principles for socially based action and each method’s relative impact
(Sharp, 1973). Sharp’s Social Power and Political Freedom (1980) built further on his
theory of power and delineated civil society’s role in controlling power through
nonviolent action.

Sharp’s most disseminated text, From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual
Framework for Liberation, is a handbook on how to overthrow dictatorships using his
198 nonviolent methods. From Dictatorship to Democracy, originally written for the
Burmese democratic movement in 1993, is available in over 30 languages and is free
from Sharp’s Albert Einstein Institute – founded in 1983 to promote nonviolent action
globally (BBC, 21 February 2011; New York Times, 16 February 2011).

Sharp has written approximately 30 books on nonviolence, including:
•

Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power: Three Case Histories, 1960

•

Civilian Defense: An Introduction, 1967

•

Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, 1971

•

Gandhi as a Political Strategist with Essays on Ethics and Politics, 1979

•

National Security Through Civilian-Based Defense, 1985

•

Making Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-Based Deterrence and
Defense, 1985

•

Resistance, Politics, and the American Struggle for Independence 1765-1775, 1986

•

Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System, 1990

•

The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggles, 1990

•

Self-Reliant Defense Without Bankruptcy or War, 1992

•

Nonviolent Action: A Research Guide, 1997

•

Waging Nonviolent Struggle: Twentieth Century Practice and Twenty First Century
Potential, 2005

•

Self-Liberation: A Guide to Strategic Planning for Action to End a Dictatorship or
Other Oppression, 2010
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•

Sharp’s Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in
Conflicts, 2011

Gene Sharp is considered the Machiavelli of nonviolence (Christian Science Monitor, 16
June 1986), and for all modern Machiavellians the interdependence of force and consent
are fundamental to any theory of power (Bates, 1975). For Sharp, a ruler’s power
depends on the political obedience of their subjects derived through a combination of
free consent and fear of sanctions (Sharp, 1973). From this ruler-subject-dichotomy
perspective, Sharp determined that power is not monolithic: while the ruler may hold
centralised power this is not a permanent and unchangeable arrangement.

For Sharp, power is pluralistic and dependent upon an intricate structure of human and
institutional relationships for its reinforcement (Sharp, 1973; Sharp, 1980; Sharp, 2005).
Sharp has termed these independent groups and institutions ‘loci (or places) of power’,
including family, social, cultural and religious groups, government bodies and political
parties. Where loci are effectively dispersed throughout society, such loci will regulate a
ruler’s power and that of other loci. However, if no significant loci exist, challenging a
ruler’s power will have limited effect (Sharp, 1980).

Sharp maintains that beyond the state power is rooted in society itself, so the more
extensive the ruler’s control over society, the greater cooperation the ruler will require
from the individuals they rule (Sharp, 1973; Sharp, 2005). The degree of cooperation and
obedience of the subjects, which remains essentially voluntary despite sanctions,
determines the extent to which a ruler can access sources of power upon which the ruler
is dependent (Sharp, 1973).

Sharp identified six sources of political power; it is rare for all six sources to be
completely available or totally absent (Sharp, 1973; Sharp, 2005). The sources of
political power are:
•

Authority:

the

extent

to

which

people

voluntarily

accept

the

ruler’s

authority/legitimacy without the imposition of sanctions. The greater the authority,
the more obedience the ruler will receive.
•

Human resources: the number of people who are obedient and cooperate with the
ruler, or provide special assistance.
9

•

Skills and knowledge: the abilities and skills of the people obeying and cooperating
with the ruler.

•

Intangible factors: psychological and ideological factors that influence behaviour and
attitudes toward obedience, and the presence or absence of a common ideology or
faith.

•

Material resources: the extent to which the ruler controls natural resources, financial
resources, the economic system, property, transportation and communication.

•

Sanctions: the type and extent of coercive measures to enforce obedience (Sharp,
1973; Sharp, 2005; Sharp, 2010).

Consent is central to Sharp’s theory of power. Sharp reasons that people provide consent
out of: habit; fear of sanctions; moral obligation; self-interest; psychological
identification with the ruler; indifference; and an absence of self-confidence to disobey
(Sharp, 1973; Sharp, 2005). While various social forces influence the reasons for
obedience, ultimately the individual’s will or opinion determines consent (Sharp, 1973).
For instance: subjects obeying out of habit choose not to consciously examine their
compliance; certain individuals may dislike a ruler or system but obey out of selfinterest; and even in the case of sanctions a subject makes a choice to obey to avoid
punishment (Sharp, 1973).

Sharp emphasises that “the obedience of subjects is essentially the result of the act of
volition” (Sharp, 1973, p. 26). Sharp is clear that consent can either be ‘free’ consent or
what he has termed ‘intimidated’ consent through fear of sanctions, either way consent is
determined by the individual’s will or choice (Sharp, 2005). With a ruler’s political
power overwhelmingly determined by the subjects’ willing obedience, power may be
weakened by shifting conditions affecting the individual’s will and reasons for
cooperating (Sharp, 1973; Sharp, 1980; Sharp, 2005). A ruler may counteract a loss of
obedience by increasing the reasons to obey, such as harsher sanctions or greater rewards
for loyalty. However, a change in the subjects’ will, may lead to withdrawal of consent
from the ruler and thus their service and cooperation to the sources of political power
(Sharp, 1973).
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We have arrived at Sharp’s strategy of nonviolent action based on the premise that the
pluralistic nature of power enables subjects to withdraw consent and thus control or even
destroy a ruler’s power sources (Sharp, 1973). The extent to which a ruler’s power is
weakened depends not only on the quality of nonviolent action and number of nonviolent
protestors, but also on the dominant political and social milieu (Sharp, 1973; Sharp,
2005). Sharp acknowledges that society’s structural conditions influence the
effectiveness of withdrawing consent; where autonomous social groups and political
institutions expand to create ‘democratic space’ the greater strength society will have in
controlling the ruler’s power (Sharp, 1973; Sharp, 2010). Accordingly, society’s strength
is weaker in highly centralized states that strongly control institutions and social groups
(Sharp, 1980). Under such conditions significant power-wielding groups, the ‘loci of
power’ will either be absent or incapable of independent action, increasing the difficulty
of controlling the ruler’s power through modification of power sources (Sharp, 1980).

Nevertheless, Sharp stresses that incongruence between the formal government structure
and the structural condition of society leaves the ruler’s power dependent on the vigour
of social organization and the subjects themselves (Sharp, 1980). Irrespective of the
prevailing formal government structure, through individual human agency consent can be
withdrawn to challenge the power of a ruler. Refusal to consent requires knowledge on
how to resist, motivation to resist, self-confidence and willingness to experience
inconvenience and suffering (Sharp, 2005). Political freedom is not bestowed on subjects
by the ruler nor does formal structures of government alone determine degrees of
freedom or set limits on a ruler’s power. While people depend on the support of their
government, governments conversely depend on the good will of their people (Sharp,
1973; Sharp, 1980).

Critics of Sharp (Lipsitz & Kritzer, 1975; Martin, 1989; McGuinness, 1993) dismiss his
consensual power theory as not being identifiable in all power relationships, lacking
detailed structural analysis and being too restricted to capture political systems’ full
dynamics. For Martin (1989) Sharp’s power theory based on a ruler-subject dichotomy
neglects political life’s complexity, ruling out the structures of capitalism, patriarchy and
bureaucracy as systems of power. Martin (1989) argues that capitalism can
simultaneously benefit and oppress those living within the system, just as patriarchy
cannot simply be extinguished by withdrawing consent. McGuinness (1993) too is
critical that Sharp’s theory overlooks patriarchy as a system of power, in which consent
11

is of limited value in terms of gender relations. Lipsitz and Kritzer (1975) stress that
political power is not always about controlling people but could simply be used to
control resources or territory.

Consent as viewed by Sharp has been criticized for placing too much emphasis on human
agency and choice, overlooking structural limitations (McGuinness, 1993; Atack, 2006).
Wehr, Burgess and Burgess (1994) argue that for subordinate groups choice can at most
be considered cooptation (positively leveraged) or coercion (negatively leveraged), and
that these ‘choices’ do not constitute consent as a viable alternative is absent. For Atack
(2006) the term consent underestimates a far more complex individual dealing with
oppression at multiple levels: the individual’s internal psychological world, pragmatic
social relations of daily life and with state institutions.

In McGuinness’ (1993) view a shared political culture underpins consent, therefore
consent will only be present where a shared culture exists – just as a common set of
values are required when consent is withdrawn. For Lipsitz and Kritzer (1975) if a ruler’s
goal does not involve extracting submission directly from their subjects, then a ruler’s
power will not be dependent on consent. If Sharp has failed to adequately characterise
power then his strategy of withdrawing consent may also be inadequate (McGuinness,
1993). Despite these criticisms, Martin (1989) merits Sharp’s strategy as being ideal for
stimulating action whereas structural approaches are better suited to analysis.
Nonetheless, for Sharp’s critics power is a much more complex phenomenon than
articulated in his consensually based strategy of nonviolent action.

Supporting Sharp’s theory of consensually based power is Antonio Gramsci’s theory of
hegemony, which proposes that the ‘spontaneous’ consent of the general population to
the dominant worldview imposed by the ruling group is the basis for control in society
(Bates, 1975; Jackson Lears, 1985). For Gramsci, hegemony is about ruling through
ideas not force: the ruling group procures active or passive consent from society rather
than ruling by sanctions alone (Thomas, 2009). Adamson (1980) offers two related
presuppositions for Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. Firstly, consensual power
predominates the political system as opposed to the state’s monopoly on coercive power;
and secondly, the economic base of the state must be overcome to advance to a
consciousness of common cultural, intellectual and moral awareness. Thus hegemony as
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distinguished by Gramsci is exercised primarily through a society’s ‘superstructure’ as
opposed to the base or ‘structure’.

The superstructure comprises political society as the site of coercive power and civil
society as the site of hegemonic leadership (Bocock, 1986). Only where hegemonic
leadership involves the organic cohesion of intellectual, philosophical, moral and
emotional consent between the ruler and subjects will the relationship be representational
(Bocock, 1986). As Gramsci understood it, the moment of hegemony goes beyond a
theory of state-as-force: hegemony involves active struggle between state-civil society
relations and depends on shaping the consciousness of civil society through validation of
the dominant group’s ideas and values in the public discourse (Jackson Lears, 1985;
Morton, 2007).

Fundamental to Gramsci’s theory is the dialectical integration of the theoretically distinct
moments of consent with coercion, and hegemony with domination. For Gramsci, within
the ‘normal’ exercise of hegemony force and consent are both evident, although one
factor usually predominates (Jackson Lears, 1985; Morton, 2007; Thomas, 2009).
Gramsci considered political hegemony as the moment in which civil society as the
terrain of consent and political society as the location of force make contact (Bates, 1975;
Jackson Lears, 1985; Thomas, 2009). At times Gramsci ascribed to consent active
commitment to the established order, while at other times Gramsci alluded to the
ambiguous nature of consent whereby an individual’s conscious thoughts sometimes
conflicted with their actions.

Consent, for Gramsci, reveals the contradictory and complex reality of consciousness
that combines resistance with resignation and approbation with apathy (Jackson Lears,
1985). While consent provides a method of control, the role of force should not be
overlooked, for in Gramsci’s view hegemony and domination are strategically different
components of a unitary political power. For Gramsci hegemonic rule is epitomised in
the diffusion of a consensual viewpoint throughout society and its interrelation with the
state’s coercive apparatus, without force undermining consent (Bates, 1975; Adamson,
1980; Morton, 2007). Nonetheless, where the creation of genuine hegemony fails the
state will fall back on the coercive apparatus constructed in anticipation when
‘spontaneous’ consent declines (Bates, 1975).
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With consent accorded increasing primacy in Gramsci’s theory his ‘structure’ as the site
of the social relations of production was recast to include only the material and technical
instruments of production – enabling differentiation between the economic base and the
‘superstructure’ (Jackson Lears, 1985; Bocock, 1986). Gramsci considered the ‘structure’
as simply the dominant mode of production, whereas the ‘superstructure’ comprised
long-standing private institutions such as family and religious groups, and public
institutions such as the government and army (Bates, 1975; Bocock, 1986). For Gramsci,
hegemony goes beyond the ‘structure’ to the complex realm of ‘superstructures’ where
ideas are introduced, consciousness is raised, an individual’s awareness of conflicts with
the world of production is realised, and where economic sacrifices are made to appeal to
wider social groups (Morton, 2007; Thomas, 2009).

In Gramsci’s vision civil society does not come before nor lie beyond the state, but is
rather integrated with political society – responsible for adjusting civil society to the
economic, leaving civil society the marketplace of ideologies (Bates, 1975; Morton,
2007; Thomas, 2009). Hegemony for Gramsci is all about ideologies which must
penetrate both the structure and superstructure – where the ideology is historically
organic it will have validity in moving people and elevating consciousness, but where
arbitrarily applied its longevity will be limited (Bocock, 1986; Forgacs, 1999). Gramsci
concluded that the structure will not determine forms of consciousness but rather what
forms are possible, and that through interaction between the structure and superstructure
a ‘historical bloc’, to be discussed next, may be formed where a coherent ideology will
attempt to establish hegemony (Jackson Lears, 1985; Forgacs, 1999).

Bringing Gramsci’s theory together are the key concepts of the ‘integral state’ formed of
civil society and political society and the ‘historical bloc’ as the dialectical unity of
structure and superstructure (Bocock, 1986; Thomas, 2009). The integral state is based
upon a set of common ideas and a shared philosophy in which active consent is procured
through interaction between state-civil society, the moment of hegemony, rather than
through fear of sanctions (Morton, 2007). Gramsci’s notion of a historical bloc is the
infusion of hegemony throughout society, initially through class alliances but then
through the relatively organic relationship between the structure or economic life with
that of the superstructure or political and cultural life (Adamson, 1980; Jackson Lears,
1985).
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For Gramsci, while hegemony must stem from a historical bloc not all historical blocs
become hegemonic. For hegemonic success a historical bloc’s economic and ideological
viewpoint must appeal to wide-ranging groups within society and claim some validity as
representing society’s interests at large (Adamson, 1980; Jackson Lears, 1985). When
‘organic crisis’ occurs in which the historical bloc in its entirety (both the structure and
superstructure) is no longer able to manifest hegemony or where hegemony has not been
established, the dominant group will resort to rule through force (Bates, 1975; Jackson
Lears, 1985).

Scott (1990) proposes an alternative view of consensually based power, suggesting that
the complicit behaviour of subordinates observable in the ‘public’ transcript (the
discourse of political society) could merely be a tactic; without also incorporating the
‘private’ transcript of subordinate groups the public transcript cannot elucidate the whole
story. Scott (1985) is cautious of any assessment of power that infers active ideological
support from observable compliance. For Scott (1985), there are at least two possible
interpretations to explain observable consent: subordinates actively or grudgingly accept
the hegemonic order; the alternative being acceptance through domination. Although
subordinates conform to expected behavioural norms in the public transcript, such
conformity could mask a vastly different private transcript (Scott, 1990).

In Scott’s opinion (1990) the feigned behavioural compliance of subordinate groups in
the public transcript is possible when a private transcript is created where subordinates
act out in fantasy the natural impulses of rage and anger denied reciprocal action in the
public transcript – these muted impulses provide the content of the private transcript.
Scott (1985) argues that the public transcript’s convincing behavioural and ideological
conformity is often a façade behind which resistance will be evident in the private
transcript. It is Scott’s assertion (1990) that the political life of subordinate groups is not
to be found in absolute hegemonic compliance nor in overt defiance but on the terrain
between these two opposites – in the discourse and action of the private transcript
intersecting with the public transcript.

For Scott domination, in which ‘real’ choice is absent, creates the pseudo-hegemonic
order that makes it impossible to distinguish from the public transcript alone whether the
prevailing hegemony is based on willing consent or coerced compliance (Scott, 1990).
Scott (1990) argues that through the practice of domination in the public transcript the
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private transcript of subordinate groups is created – a private transcript that will match
the intensity of the domination experienced. For Scott (1990) the public transcript
becomes the stage on which the subordinate group offers a performance of deference and
consent while privately surveying the dominant groups real intentions, and where the
dominant group polices for any signals of subordinate resistance that might weaken their
public mastery and ideological justification for domination.

Of central importance to Scott is the idea that there is always an ambiguous, coded, and
sanitized version of the subordinate group’s private transcript in the public transcript,
providing terrain to examine ideological resistance and pseudo-hegemony (Scott, 1990).
Distinguishing between the hegemonic ambition of the public transcript and the private
transcript of subordinate groups reveals a variety of political dialogues in which some
subordinates support the prevailing ideology for their own interests, while for others a
dissident culture is created that is completely obscured from the public transcript – then
there is the realm between these two where subordinates inject coded messages of their
private transcript into the public transcript (Scott, 1990).

It is the coded private transcript within the public transcript that provides evidence of a
pseudo-hegemonic order, with the prevailing conformity in the face of domination
simply an act of survival and repression of violent impulses (Scott, 1990). For Scott, the
constant dialogue between acts of resistance and thoughts about resistance facilitates
access to the realm of consciousness of subordinate groups where lines of action that are
presently impossible but plausible in the future are revealed, thus challenging the
dominant group’s hegemonic ambition both behaviourally and at the level of
consciousness (Scott, 1985).

The art of political disguise is paramount to Scott’s assertion that evidence of the private
transcript of subordinates can be recovered from the public transcript. These forms of
disguised and anonymous resistance include but are not limited to false compliance,
feigned ignorance, foot dragging, gossip and rumour, which can be individually or mass
enacted and avoids direct confrontation with the dominant group (Scott, 1985; Scott,
1990). These anonymous acts may take on more physical forms such as arson, pilfering
and violence; however, they more often manifest as passive noncompliance such as
evasion and deception (Scott, 1990). For instance, while grumbling stops short of making
an explicit statement it enables subordinates to express dissent publicly without
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provoking retaliation from the dominant group. Grumbling releases feelings of anger,
disloyalty and contempt from the private transcript in a vague form into the public
transcript revealing a larger story (Scott, 1990).

The advantage of political disguise and acts of anonymity means it is possible to declare
the private transcript while disguising individual identity. However, the muted nature of
these acts conspires to create a complicitous silence extinguishing these everyday acts of
resistance from history (Scott, 1985). While the private transcript of subordinates is
typically irrecoverable, it is through the muted or veiled forms thrown into the public
transcript that Scott (1990) believes we can recover some of the private transcript to
discover a political dialogue of resistance in the public transcript.

The theories detailed above will form the analytical framework for this thesis. Gramsci’s
theory of hegemony will be used to examine the actuality of consent predominating force
in the Libyan system, and whether this conforms to Sharp’s assertion that a ruler’s power
is based on consent despite the availability of coercive measures. While Scott’s publicprivate transcript perspective will be used to analyse if observable consent in Libya’s
public discourse provides sufficient evidence of the consensually based nature of power
as determined by Sharp.
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Chapter Two: A history of consent
“I love the masses as I love my father, yet fear them in the same way. In a
Bedouin society, with its lack of government, who can prevent a father from
punishing one of his children? It is true that they love him, but they fear him
at the same time. In the same way, I both love and fear the masses, as I love
and fear my father”
(Qadhafi cited in St John, 2008, p. 154)

Applying Sharp and Gramsci’s analytical framework, the intent of this chapter is to
provide an extensive historical narrative of the structures of consent within Libya from
the mid-nineteenth century through to the first few years of Qadhafi’s revolution. The
discourse will trace the history of the tribe and Islam as organic superstructures of
consent, and evaluate the role of these superstructures during the colonial war and under
the monarchy, where focus on economic largesse to acquire consent will also be
discussed. The analysis will then turn to the 1969 revolution where mechanisms of
consent used by Qadhafi to garner authority will be assessed to determine whether
hegemony was established as Gramsci articulates, and if these mechanisms procured
consent in the way Sharp asserts.

The Sanusiya Order
Algerian religious scholar Sayyid Muhammad bin Ali al-Sanusi known as the ‘Grand
Sanusi’ founded the Islamic revivalist movement the Sanusiya Order in Mecca in 1837.
In 1843 he turned toward Cyrenaica where he established the first zawiya or ‘Mother
Lodge’ of the Order at al-Azwiya al-Baida on the central Cyrenaican plateau, marking
the rise and expansion of the Sanusiya Order in Libya 2 (Evans-Pritchard, 1949; Davis,
1987; Vandewalle, 1995; St John, 2008). In Cyrenaica, the Grand Sanusi found an
essentially homogenous religious culture based on Sunni orthodoxy, which like most of
North Africa followed the malikite rite based on the primary sources of the Quran and
hadith 3 (Harris, 1986; Vandewalle, 1995; St John, 2008).

The Grand Sanusi’s combination of Sunni orthodoxy and Sufism’s mystical ihsan
worship resonated with the ascetic tribal ethos of the Cyrenaican nomadic and semi2

Ever since the Arabs brought Islam to Libya in 642 AD, religion has played a central role in the everyday
lives of Libyans (Obeidi, 2001, p. 38).
3

Other orthodox Sunnis also accept consensus/agreement among the faithful (ijma) and analogy/what
should be believed about the teachings of the Prophet (qiyas) as legitimate doctrinal sources—the Grand
Sanusi rejected both of these doctrines (Evans-Pritchard, 1949, p. 1; Harris, 1986, p. 32).
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nomadic Bedouins, where the Sanusiya found its inner core of support. There were fewer
adherents among the more cosmopolitan Tripolitanians, and Qadhafi would later oppose
Sufism’s influence 4 (Deeb & Deeb, 1982; El-Kikhia, 1997; St John, 2008). Under the
Grand Sanusi’s leadership the Sanusiya founded twenty-one zawiyas throughout
Cyrenaica, and his son and successor Sayyid Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanusi brought the
Sanusiya to their peak of influence by establishing another twenty-two zawiyas by the
time of his death in 1902 5 (Evans-Pritchard, 1949; Vandewalle, 2006). In terms of
Gramsci’s analytical framework, the common religious and moral basis of Islam formed
an organic superstructure that bestowed the Sanusiya with the Bedouins’ political
consent.

Libya’s tribes have traditionally played a major role in inculcating social norms, serving
as a ‘loci of power’ as described by Sharp or, in Gramscian terms, the site of hegemonic
leadership in civil society’s superstructure (Sharp, 1980; Bocock, 1986; Obeidi, 2001).
Thus the Sanusiya Order used the strength of the tribal system to turn an amalgam of
parochial tribal interests into a powerful religious and political force (Davis, 1987; ElKikhia, 1997). With their influence over the Cyrenaican Bedouin tribes firmly
established, the Order utilised the tribal social system to propel the movement into the
south-western Fazzan region and to a lesser extent, Tripolitania (Vandewalle, 1995). The
Order came to be characterised through traditional kinship structures and tribal identities,
with zawiya established on the basis of tribes or tribal sections rather than towns; this
tactic was also utilised to manage tribal rivalries 6 (Evans-Pritchard, 1949; Davis, 1987).

As tribal society increasingly came into contact with outside political forces, the
Sanusiya movement provided a rudimentary structure for tribal political expression,
crystallizing in Cyrenaica as an opposition movement when a jihad was declared against
Italian colonialism (Vandewalle, 2006; St John, 2008). “The tribes provided the Order
with a social system, and the Order gave to that system a political organization” (Evans4

The Sanusiya also accept the teachings of the sunna, a collection of traditions about the life and habits of
the Prophet (Evans-Pritchard, 1949, p. 1).

5

When the Grand Sanusi died in 1859, a regency of ten Shaikhs was appointed to control the Order until
Sayyid Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanusi, born in 1844 the eldest of two surviving sons, was of age to lead
the Order (Evans-Pritchard, 1949, p. 19).
6

The origin of tribal divisions originated with the eleventh century arrival of two Arab tribes, the Bani
Hilal who settled in Tripolitania and Tunisia, and the Bani Salim who settled in Cyrenaica and Syrte
(Obeidi, 2001, p. 43; Ahmida, 2009, p. 46).
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Pritchard, 1949, p. 91). In Sharp’s terms, the Sanusiya’s power rested on their authority
and a shared faith with the Cyrenaican tribes, a power they extended by procuring greater
human resources in the Fazzanese and Tripolitanian tribes (Sharp, 1973). Over the
Order’s 80-year lifespan the superstructural elements of Islam and tribal life were vital
for extending the Sanusiya’s hegemonic leadership.

The colonial war
During the Turco-Italian War 1911-12 resistance formed under the Ottoman government,
supported by the Sanusiya Order. However, when the Ottomans surrendered Libya to
Italy in November 1912 7, resistance continued as a more purely Cyrenaican Bedouin
struggle in the name of the Sanusiya, now under the leadership of Sayyid Ahmad alSharif 8 (Evans-Pritchard, 1949; Anderson, 1983; Vandewalle, 2006). In Tripolitania
meanwhile, the absence of a cohesive leadership owing to factional disagreements meant
their action proved relatively ineffective 9 (St John, 2008). While resistance proved the
dominant pattern across the provinces not all Libyans joined the struggle, with merchants
in Tripoli and urban notables in Cyrenaica collaborating with the Italians, motivated by
status, power, and economic self-interest (St John, 2008).

During World War I Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif abdicated Sanusiya leadership to his cousin
Sayyid Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi al-Sanusi who, supported by British authorities,
garnered back some authority over Cyrenaica from the Italians 10 (Anderson, 1983;
Vandewalle, 2006). Similarly, Tripolitanian notables also seeking to regain control from
the colonialists formed the Tripoli Republic in 1918, but unable to generate international
support and enfeebled by internal discord and factionalism struggled to wring

7

Sovereignty to Libya remained divided between Italy and Turkey for some years, until the Ottomans
signed an armistice treaty with the Allies in October 1918 ending both their involvement in World War I
and influence in Libya (Anderson, 1986, p. 185).

8

After the death of Sayyid Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanusi, his nephew Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif assumed
leadership falling into three periods: 1902-1912 unsuccessfully opposing French expansion in the Sahara;
1912-1918 leading the Bedouins of Cyrenaica against the Italians and British; and from 1918-1933 when
he went into exile, eventually dying in Saudi Arabia (Evans-Pritchard, 1949, p. 27; St John, 2008, p. 13).
9

Tripolitanian notables, Farhat al-Zawi and Sulayman al-Baruni took opposing positions: the former
wanted to negotiate with the Italians while the latter advocated continued armed resistance (Anderson,
1986, p. 188).
10

Negotiations with the Italians through British intermediaries resulted in two related agreements, AlZuwaytina in April 1916 and Akrama in April 1917 granting Sanusiya sovereignty to the Cyrenaican
hinterland (St John, 2008, pp. 66-67).
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concessions from the Italians 11 (Joffe & McLachlan, 1982; St John, 2008). In October
1920 when Idris al-Sanusi was granted the title of Amir in Cyrenaica from the Italians,
the Republic appealed to Idris to extend the amirate into Tripolitania so they might also
benefit from Italian patronage; after considerable hesitation Idris accepted 12 (Anderson,
1986b; Vandewalle, 2006; St John, 2008). The Fascist takeover of Italy in October 1922
ended Italian collaboration with local Libyan elites, and Idris al-Sanusi went into exile.
This left more martial members of the Order to resist the Italian pacification campaigns,
where another Sanusiya brother’s leadership would come to the fore.

The Sanusiya Order led resistance against the Italians from 1917 but their role became
more prominent during the Italo-Sanusi War 1923-32. The Italians had subdued
Tripolitania by late 1924 but came to expect strong resistance from Cyrenaica, and thus it
was with most of Libya’s anti-Italian leaders in exile that the Cyrenaican tribal shaikh
Sidi Umar al-Mukhtar became the resistance figurehead (Anderson, 1986b; Deeb &
Deeb, 1986; Vandewalle, 2006; St John, 2008). Al-Mukhtar embodied the rare qualities
of marabat (holy man) and mujahid (fighter for the faith) - a combination of religious
legitimacy and physical endurance that resonated with the Bedouin who made up the
majority of the resistance (Evans-Pritchard, 1949; Davis, 1987).

Decades of Sanusiya influence resulted in notable cohesion among the Cyrenaican tribes,
which along with anti-colonialist sentiment ensured the Bedouins remained committed to
the cause (St John, 2008). Nevertheless, the resistance eventually died in 1931 with alMukhtar, who was captured and subsequently hanged before 20,000 Bedouin. By 1932
Libya was completely subdued and the Sanusiya Order decimated, however the exiled
Sanusiya leadership remained Libya’s major indigenous political force 13 (EvansPritchard, 1949; Deeb & Deeb, 1982). Aware of the enduring legacy of the colonial
period, in 1981 Qadhafi commissioned a feature film about the life and exploits of alMukhtar entitled Lion of the Desert, and used anti-colonial sentiment as a platform for
11

The Tripoli Republic consisted of a four person council supported by a twenty-four member advisory
group. The first formally republican government in the Arab world was not based on republican sentiment,
rather an inability to agree on an acting head of state (Anderson, 1986, p. 205).
12

The 25 October 1920 Accord of al-Rajma granted Idris the title of Amir in return for dismantling
Cyrenican military units and applying the Legge Fondamentale, which provided for a special form of
Italian-Libyan citizenship (St John, 2008, p. 69).
13

The Fascist regime was unable to defend its ‘Fourth Shore’ during the North African campaign of 19401943 during World Word II, with Italy eventually signing a peace treaty on 10 February 1947 renouncing
all rights to Libya (St John, 2008, pp. 78, 91).

21

authority after the 1 September Revolution (St John, 2008). In a Gramscian sense, the
superstructural elements of Islam and tribal military organisation under the hegemonic
leadership of the Sanusiya order were used as cultural and social weapons to fight against
colonialism (Ahmida, 2009).

Libya under the monarchy
On 24 December 1951 the United Kingdom of Libya was declared an independent
nation, with the title of king conferred upon Idris al-Sanusi claiming religious legitimacy
as head of the Sanusiya Order (St John, 2008; Vandewalle, 2006). At independence
Libya lacked a unified political community, thus a federal system 14 of government with
an elaborate and expensive administrative structure of overlapping jurisdictions was
adopted to balance the capitals, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania 15 (Anderson, 1986b). All
major tribes were represented in the country’s parliament, but with real authority codified
in the king and his diwan (mainly Cyrenaican tribal elites loyal to the Sanusiya)
parliament simply acceded to the monarchy’s decisions (Vandewalle, 1998). Moreover,
after violent clashes marred the first parliamentary elections in February 1952, Libyan
politics descended into a “kind of benign despotism” (St John, 2011, p. 40) in which
provincial political structures influenced by tribal leaders and urban notables became the
principle forums for political competition 16 (St John, 2011).

The commercialisation of oil in the 1960s prompted the adoption of a unitary
government in April 1963 to improve efficiency of the multifarious government
structures 17 (Vandewalle, 1998). Theoretically the unitary system aimed to improve
governance, cut costs, and streamline administrative systems by centralising services at
the national level. In reality, the unitary system increased the power of the king and the
royal diwan, eviscerating the provincial bureaucracies’ power. The new centralized
14

Cyrenaica and Fazzan favoured a federal system, concerned a unitary government would be dominated
by Tripolitania where two-thirds of the country’s population lived. Tripolitania argued for a unitary
government, suggesting a federal system would weaken the central government’s authority to implement
decisions of national interest (Vandewalle, 2006, p. 47).
15

By 1958 the total government payroll equalled 12 percent of GNP. The provincial governments of
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica employed more civil servants than did the federal government, which alone had
a payroll that approached forty thousand employees (Anderson, 1986, p. 256; Vandewalle, 1995, p. 5).

16

The defeated National Congress Party accused Tripolitania of electoral fraud resulting in violent conflict.
Henceforth, political parties were outlawed and no multi-party elections were held from 1952 until the
Qadhafi regime was overthrown in 2011 (Vandewalle, 2006, p. 69; St John, 2008, p. 112).
17

On paper, the centralized government abolished the three traditional national divisions replacing them
with ten administrative districts each with its own governor (Harris, 1986, p. 11; St John, 2008, p. 115).
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government was staffed by a narrow circle of intimates to the king, leaving state
institutions devoid of real power (Vandewalle, 2006; St John, 2008; St John, 2011). In
the unitary environment the king attempted to promote a sense of Libyan nationalism but
to no avail. Politically, Libyans were disenfranchised from an absolutist political system
that came to rely on economic handouts for acquiescence (Naur, 1986; Vandewalle,
1995; St John, 2011). Under the monarchy, Libyan politics was characterized by the
perpetuation of family, tribal, and parochial interests at the expense of a modern state.

The discovery of oil in the late 1950s and its commercialisation in the 1960s profoundly
changed the economic base of Libyan society18 (Joffe & McLachlan, 1982; Vandewalle,
1995). At independence, Libya was one of the poorest independent countries in the
world, with 35 percent of GNP accumulated from foreign aid and rental income from
leasing military bases to the United States and Britain 19 (Allen, 1981; Vandewalle,
1998). In 1960 70 percent of the population was employed in the agricultural sector,
which only contributed 26 percent to the GNP. Meanwhile, by 1958 the industrial sector
only accounted for ten percent of GNP, with some 20,000 employees working in
industries such as flourmills, canning tomatoes, and handicrafts (Joffe & McLachlan,
1982).

The early 1960s marked a change in Libya’s source of income with petroleum
accounting for 98.7 percent of exports by late 1963 20 (Vandewalle, 1998). Between 1964
and 1966 oil revenues increased between 17 and 29 percent annually - relatively modest
compared to the 100 percent increases experienced prior to 1964. Moreover, between
1962 and 1969 national income increased from (Libyan Dinars) LD180 million to LD820
million, with gross disposable incomes increasing 15 percent annually during the same
time period (Allan, 1981). Spending oil revenues increased dramatically between 1963
and 1969, with all sectors such as housing, transportation, communication, health, and
education reaping the benefits. The substantial capital inflows impacted all levels of
society increasing the standard of living and nurturing entrepreneurial and employment

18

Oil exploration began in Libya in 1955. In 1959 American prospectors confirmed commercially viable
quantities at Amal and Zelten, separate oilfields in Cyrenaica (St John, 2008, p. 121).
19

Aside from foreign aid and rental income, the other major sources of revenue consisted of the sale of
scrap metal left behind by the belligerents during the war and esparto grass used in craftwork (Anderson,
1986a, p. 67; Vandewalle, 1995, p. 5).
20

The production of oil climbed from 20,000 barrels per day in 1960 to almost 3 million barrels in
September 1969 (Vandewalle, 2006, p. 63).
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opportunities unparalleled in Libya’s economic history (Allen, 1981). In addition to
enriching the government, the accumulation of substantial oil revenues precipitated
enormous strains on the traditional administrative and cultural fabric of Libyan society,
where a politically awakened populace demanded change that the monarchy appeared
unwilling or unable to accommodate (St John, 2008; St John, 2011).

During the first decade of independence the monarchy overwhelmingly relied on kinship
for economic distribution, creating a domestic political economy in which public
administration and private interests were virtually indistinguishable (Anderson, 1986b;
Vandewalle, 1995; Vandewalle, 1998). However, with the commercialisation of oil in the
early 1960s Libya changed from a poor desert economy to a super-affluent one,
becoming the fourth largest oil exporter toward the end of the decade (Naur, 1986; St
John, 2008). Rapid economic growth began to undermine the king’s reliance on kinship
to distribute the country’s resources and as a source of political power, but needing to
maintain political quiescence the monarchy turned toward large-scale patronage and
distributive measures (Vandewalle, 1995). Recruitment to distributive outlets followed
the traditional pattern of kinship alliance, with tribal leaders (particularly in Cyrenaica),
the royal diwan, and Sanusiya family members collectively controlling the economic
bureaucracy - a bureaucracy corrupted by the inundation of oil wealth (El Fathaly &
Palmer, 1980; Vandewalle, 1998; St John, 2008).

For politically disenfranchised Libyans, the monarchy’s main attraction was its role as
the purveyor of economic handouts, but the growing economic disparities between the
provinces and among individuals unleased social tensions and divided loyalties. The
monarchy’s resistance to modernizing Libya’s human and material resources, or any
serious attempt to broaden its political base, fuelled demands for social and political
change (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980; Vandewalle, 1995; St John, 2008; St John, 2011).
By the end of the 1960s many Libyans concluded that Idris’ policies were parochial, if
not corrupt and had to be changed, but without a galvanizing national ideology with
which to express collective dissent Libyans turned to the nascent forces of Arab
nationalism (St John, 2008; St John, 2011). Corruption had devalued the king’s religious
legitimacy, with authority now resting on economic largesse - albeit unevenly distributed
(Anderson, 1986a). In Gramsci terms, because political society had not adjusted civil
society to the new economic structure, rule through hegemony was denied with coercive
force lingering in the background should economic consent fail.
24

Qadhafi’s 1969 revolution
On 1 September 1969 The Free Officers’ Movement headed by a twelve-member
directorate the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) with Muammar Qadhafi as
leader, carried out a bloodless coup overthrowing the Sanusiya monarchy 21 (Naur, 1986).
With Libyans deeply dissatisfied with the corruption and mismanagement of the
monarchy - eager for change, and hungry for ideological fulfilment, the ‘One September
Revolution’ was received by a wave of spontaneous support, albeit out of the desire for
change, rather than specific support for Qadhafi (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980; Harris,
1986; St John, 2011). Vandewalle (1995) argues that many Libyans remained apathetic,
having little interest in the revolutionaries beyond their ability to distribute the revenues
of an oil state. The monarchy’s authority had been established on the historical traditions
of tribe and Islam, but neither Qadhafi nor the RCC could claim any such legitimacy
coming from less prestigious tribes marginalized under the monarchy 22 (First, 1974;
Vandewalle, 2008; St John, 2011). As Al-Werfalli (2011) states, where traditional or
rational-legal authority is absent, charismatic legitimacy provides an alternative, often
utilised as a coping mechanism when traditional societies breakdown.

Without any traditional authority Qadhafi set about establishing his charismatic
credentials with his youth, down-to-earth manner, and religious devoutness proving
advantageous (El-Kikhia, 1997; Vandewalle, 2008). Additionally, being neither
Cyrenaican nor Tripolitanian but a Bedouin from Sirte made him an ideal leader for the
rival regions, with his humble origins rallying the respect and support of the minor tribes
(Harris, 1986; Vandewalle, 2006). Moreover, the new regime’s major platforms of Arab
nationalism, opposition to colonialism and imperialism, and a commitment to Islam
ingratiated these young revolutionaries to the Libyan people (Bearman, 1986; Harris,
1986). As to whether Qadhafi’s charisma, which had proven the most powerful
psychological mechanism (what Sharp terms an intangible factor) of consent during the
first years of the revolution, could be transformed into a unifying ideology to penetrate
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At the time of the 1969 coup, King Idris was abroad for medical treatment. Idris eventually settled in
Egypt, living in exile in Cairo until his death on 25 May 1983 aged 94 (St John, 2011, p. 47).
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Only two of the twelve-man Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) came from major tribes, and one
came from a privileged background. Mgarief was a member of the Sa’adi tribe the al-Magharba and Yunis
belonged to an important tribe from the Augila oasis in Chad. Meheishy was born of a Misuratan father
who was a provincial notable (First, 1974, p. 115).
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the structure and superstructure to establish hegemony remained to be seen (El Fathaly &
Palmer, 1980; Vandewalle, 2008).

Colonel Qadhafi inherited a state based on a religious foundation in which Islam featured
as the central political ideology, so to ensure the regime’s survival and success the new
leadership identified with Islam to legitimise its actions 23 (Allen, 1981; Anderson, 1983;
Takeyh, 2000). Apart from Qadhafi’s personal commitment to Islam, Islamic rhetoric
was employed to undermine the religious authority that had sustained the monarchy, and
to establish the new regime’s own religious credentials (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980;
Anderson, 1986b; Vandewalle, 1995). The ulama more than any other group in a Muslim
country have the power to influence public opinion and legitimise the actions of a ruler,
and given Qadhafi lacked the social prestige of the previous elite he set about forging an
alliance with the orthodox non-Sanusiya ulama not accorded power under the monarchy
(Takeyh, 2000; Gibrell, 2001).

The orthodox religious establishment, enjoying an improved status under Qadhafi,
allowed themselves to be used as a source of legitimacy during the early years of the
revolution; it was through religious authority that Qadhafi reintroduced sharia law as the
basis of the Libyan legal code (Anderson, 1983). However, when the jurisprudence of the
orthodox ulama interfered with Qadhafi’s increasingly idiosyncratic interpretation of
Islam, he discarded them as a source of legitimacy (Anderson, 1983; Harris, 1986). To
emphasise the revolutionary regime’s Islamic status acceptable religious activities were
also redefined, with the consumption of alcohol and any public entertainment considered
pornographic or obscene banned (St John, 1983; Anderson, 1986b). By the mid-1970s,
Qadhafi had consolidated authority by coopting Islam’s historical legitimacy as an
organic superstructure and intangible source of political power.

Part of Qadhafi’s initial popular appeal was his commitment to Arab nationalism and
discarding the vestiges of colonialism and imperialism that had long suppressed Libya 24.
23

The Qadadfa tribe of which Qadhafi was a member was a saintly (murabit) though not noble or wealthy
tribe, said to be descendants of the Prophet. Although proud of his tribal origins, Qadhafi made no claim to
a special religious charisma to justify the regime’s accession to power (Anderson, 1983, p. 138).
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The 1969 revolution generation had grown up during a period in Arab history marked by numerous
tumultuous events: the creation of the Jewish state in Palestine; the Egyptian Revolution and Nasser’s
ascent to power, the Algerian war of liberation; a succession of military coups in Syria; the overthrow of
the monarchy in Iraq; the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the tripartite invasion of Egypt (AlWerfalli, 2011, p. 16).
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Qadhafi and his Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) garnered considerable support
by creating a sense of political allegiance among Libyans – drawing on Libya’s history of
anticolonial resistance and presenting themselves as heirs to colonial hero al-Mukhtar
(Harris, 1986; Vandewalle, 2008; Ahmida, 2009). Qadhafi’s early action in successfully
negotiating evacuation of British and American military bases, symbolic of foreign
domination, was regarded heroic and miraculous against what many Libyans believed
were omnipotent nations, winning the regime mass support 25 (El-Fathaly & Palmer,
1980; Ahmida, 2009; Al-Werfalli, 2011).

On 21 July 1970, Qadhafi announced that prime agricultural, business and other
properties owned by Italians, a major source of contention among Libyans, were to be
confiscated and restored to the Libyan people. Additionally, Libyan citizenship was
denied to Italians forcing their repatriation to Italy (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980). Within
three months of Qadhafi’s proclamation up to 20,000 Italians had departed, relinquishing
21,000 hectares of farming land, 1700 properties, and approximately LD9 million in
frozen funds – Qadhafi had successfully removed a perceived threat to the revolution and
created a nationalistic charisma around his person 26 (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980;
Bearman, 1986; Al-Werfalli, 2011). Moreover, Italian place and street names were
changed into Arabic, Italian churches were closed or turned into mosques, with all
foreign passports translated into Arabic (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980; Bearman, 1986; St
John, 2011).

With growing claims for Arab nationalism these symbolic acts of national independence
and the glorification of Libya’s Arab history and culture enhanced the regime’s
legitimacy while establishing Qadhafi’s credentials as a future leader of the Arab
revolution 27. Nevertheless, in a Gramscian sense, while Arab nationalism provided the
regime with a superstructure of consent, the consensual nature of pan-Arabism was more
25

In the mid-1960s, being more economically independent and with the appeal of Arab nationalism
conflicting with the monarchy’s pro-Western stance, plans were already underway to evacuate the United
States and British military bases (Harris, 1986, p. 12). The British evacuated Al-Adem Base on 28 March
1970 and the Americans left Wheelus Air Base on 11 June 1970, after which these two dates became
official holidays commemorated annually in popular festivities (St John, 1983, p. 474).
26

7 October was proclaimed a national holiday marking the date in 1970 that Italian-owned assets were
confiscated and all remaining Italians expelled (St John, 1983, p. 474).
27

The blessing of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, the preeminent national hero to Libyan youth,
enhanced Colonel Qadhafi’s aura of strength and sanctity. After Nasser’s death in 1970, Qadhafi enhanced
his charismatic credentials by claiming to be Nasser’s legitimate heir of the Arab revolution (Al-Werfalli,
2011, p. 26).

27

in response to the prevailing circumstances rather than being an organic phenomenon –
this is supported by Qadhafi’s recognition of the futility of Arab nationalism, which he
abandoned in the late 1990s to instead pursue pan-Africanism (St John, 2011).

Qadhafi’s charismatic figure was further reinforced when he seemingly single-handedly
forced a revision of world oil prices in the early 1970s (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980). The
monarchy’s 1955 petroleum law entrusted the entire economic development of Libyan
oil to multinational oil companies, leaving the government to simply collect its 50
percent share of net revenues; this arrangement led to the production of too much, too
fast, threatening the long-term health of Libyan oil fields (Allan, 1981; St John, 2011).
The oil companies’ monopoly over Libya’s oil industry came to an end when Qadhafi
and the RCC moved to assert domestic control and increased the posted price of oil
(Ahmida, 2009; St John, 2011).

The revolutionary regime’s conservation policy forced a reduction in the production of
oil by 40 percent between 1970 and 1972, adversely affecting independent oil companies
(Allan, 1981). Occidental were most vulnerable to the conservation policy, with no other
oil reserves outside Libya, they were forced to accept the May 1970 cut in production of
400,000 barrels per day (bpd) and an increase of $0.30 per barrel in the posted price of
crude oil (Allan, 1981; St John, 2011). In the same year cuts of around 125,000 bpd
were levelled at other independents, with the RCC eventually cutting oil companies’
collective production by 800,000 bpd while increasing the price per barrel; this hardline
policy ended the myth that only oil producers could set the posted price of oil (Allen,
1981; St John, 2011).

Reduced production had an immediate impact on world markets – in Libya the higher
prices sustained or increased revenues while oil reserves were conserved (Allan, 1981).
Qadhafi’s successful negotiations raised Libya’s crude oil to one of the highest-priced
among the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Companies (OPEC) members; from
1972 OPEC controlled price-setting with Libya simply ensuring its prices were
competitive with other producers 28 (Al-Werfalli, 2011). Qadhafi consolidated his
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Libya’s oil revenues for the fiscal year 1970-71 were LD 469 million, in 1971-72 revenues rose to LD
652 million, and then levelled at LD 646 million in 1972-73 but escalated with the rest of OPC in 1974
after the October 1973 crisis (Allan, 1981, pp. 184-185).
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authority over Libya’s major material resource, one of Sharp’s six sources of political
power, which he would use to procure consent for his leadership.

With Libyans already accustomed to the workings of a distributive state, the
revolutionary regime applied the strategy of buying support by extending Libya’s
national prosperity to all sectors of society (Al-Werfalli, 2011). Libya became a land of
free social services offering healthcare, education, childcare, and unemployment
compensation, which enjoyed widespread support (Harris, 1986; St John, 2011). Though
official policy advocated a socialist economic system the revolutionary regime
encouraged and subsidized capitalist ventures from 1969 to 1973 (St John, 1983).
Farmers could purchase land taking on mortgages for only 10 percent of the estimated
value, while receiving a government salary until the land yielded returns (El Fathaly &
Palmer). Additionally, small businesses flourished with the adoption of a ‘Libya first’
policy in which Libyan firms were granted all government contracts (Vandewalle, 1998).
Government finance was also available to establish commercial enterprises with 95-100
percent of initial capital loaned (Allan, 1981).

The economic initiatives adopted by the regime provided a direct economic stake in the
revolution to a broad section of the population, winning the regime a tentative level of
support. However, it would not provide the long-lasting support needed for political
legitimacy (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980; Al-Werfalli, 2011). Qadhafi’s support of
capitalist enterprises secured a base of support for the regime, but when the socialist
revolution was unleased in the mid-1970s Qadhafi condemned capitalism and the groups
that had brought him some legitimacy (Vandewalle, 1998; St John, 2011). Qadhafi’s
intangible mixture of charismatic, historical, symbolic, and cultural elements resonated
among the Libyan population giving him a degree of authority. Nevertheless, to ensure
the longevity of the regime and achieve hegemony in the true Gramscian sense, Qadhafi
would need to achieve ideological consensus within the political and civil superstructures
of Libyan society, the alternative being rule through domination.
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Chapter Three: The green shadow of domination
“You should understand that since 1977 we no longer have any constitutional
prerogative…You may seek our advice; we are ready to play the role of revolutionary
instigators…However, we are restricted by people’s authority…People’s authority has
become restrictive even on revolutionaries…it restricts even Mu’ammar al-Qadhdhafi;
I cannot act”
(Cited in Vandewalle, 2006, p. 120)

The chapter aims to examine the reality of Sharp’s theory that consent (regardless of
whether it is ‘free’ or ‘intimidated’ consent) remains the basis of political power. Sharp’s
assertion will be challenged by incorporating both Gramsci’s assumption that where
‘spontaneous’ consent fails the state will rule through domination, and Scott’s publicprivate transcript theory that seeming consent in the public discourse can disguise
resistance to domination in the private transcript. To adequately convey the complexity
of the Libyan state apparatus this chapter will trace the revolutionary regime’s initial
attempts at political consolidation and mobilization, examine the formal and informal
political structures, and use of material resources to pursue a socialist economy. While
this chapter is relatively detailed and descriptive, this approach was necessary to
sufficiently demonstrate the revolutionary regime’s successive failures to win consent,
which ultimately resulted in rule through coercion, fragmentation and force.

Political consolidation and mobilization
To reduce the potential counter-revolutionary influence of the tribes and tribal sections
that had prospered under the monarchy, in November 1970 Qadhafi abolished the tribes’
legal authority and reconfigured the traditional administrative boundaries into mixed
tribal zones (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980; St John, 2011). Moreover, local officials were
dismissed and replaced by new local administrators typically from less prestigious tribes
whose origins were more congenial with those of the Revolutionary Command Council
(RCC) (Obeidi, 2001). To fill the void left by the abolition of the tribal system, Colonel
Qadhafi established the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) on 12 June 1971 as the sole political
party in Libya, to serve as the primary link between the people and the regime 29
(Vandewalle, 1995; Vandewalle, 2006; St John, 2011). Thus Qadhafi abandoned the tribe
as an historical superstructure of consent through which ideologies were disseminated,
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Law Number 71 of 30 May 1972 stipulated that anyone who created a political party or was involved in
political activity outside the ASU would be subject to the death penalty (First, 1974, p. 133; Vandewalle,
2006, p. 83).
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and arbitrarily established a single political institution to instil revolutionary ideology; as
Gramsci asserts, where ideology is arbitrarily applied its longevity will be limited
(Forgacs, 1999).

The structure of the ASU made it less a popular political movement than a parallel
administrative structure to the RCC machinery; it suffered from the inherent conflict of
representing both the regime’s interests and local concerns 30 (Obeidi, 2001). The RCC
rigidly controlled the ASU ensuring bureaucratic remnants of the monarchy were
replaced with its own modernising adherents, although they proved mainly apolitical. By
centralising decision-making power in the ASU the RCC stifled local initiative that
conflicted with the RCC’s goals; and squashed any re-emergence of tribal solidarities – a
task that proved more arduous than expected (First, 1974; Vandewalle, 2006). With the
scope and activities of the ASU closely circumscribed by the RCC, the ASU lacked the
legitimacy to mobilise Libyans toward political participation (Vandewalle, 1998; Obeidi,
2001; St John, 2011). El Fathaly and Palmer (1980) argue that the dismal membership
record of the ASU reflected the average Libyans political apathy, along with an active
boycott by traditional tribal and religious leaders. In Sharp’s terms Qadhafi’s regime was
unable to procure authority and human resources as sources of political power, instead
using coercion and veto to enforce political legitimacy. While organic superstructures of
consent (which Qadhafi had abandoned or was in the process of discarding) in the tribe
and Islam continued to influence the political landscape.

Dissatisfied with the performance of the ASU, Colonel Qadhafi decided on a more
radical strategy of bottom-up mobilisation to encourage political participation
(Vandewalle, 2008). On 15 April 1973 Qadhafi proclaimed the ‘Popular or Cultural
Revolution’ where he announced a five-point program to breakdown the residual power
of the old bureaucracy and replace them with popularly elected people’s committees
(PCs) serving as subordinate local branches of the national ASU (Joffe & McLachlan,
1982; Naur, 1986; Vandewalle, 2006; Obeidi, 2001). Libyans received Qadhafi’s
declaration reluctantly; unconvinced the administration could be changed from the
bottom-up. However, after initial hesitation some workers and students established PCs
in their place of work or study, displacing the modernising administrators appointed by
30

The ASU consisted of three basic tiers: local, provincial, and national assemblies. Representatives met
once every four months at the General Congress being the highest authority of the ASU, where the RCC
occupied the position of executive committee (Vandewalle, 1998, p. 67; Al-Werfalli, 2011, p. 29).
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the RCC 31 (Al-Werfalli, 2011; St John, 2011). While committee elections often resulted
in the re-empowerment of the same traditional patron-figures Qadhafi sought to
marginalise, the RCC often intervened by appointing loyal supporters from the lower
classes who were considered more closely aligned with the masses. This often filled
committees with unqualified members, without appropriate administrative and
managerial skills (Joffe & McLachlan, 1982; El-Kikhia, 1997; Al-Werfalli, 2011).

Much like the ASU, the people’s committees system failed to generate spontaneous
popular participation, with most Libyans remaining indifferent to Qadhafi’s system of
popular democracy (Bearman, 1986; Vandewalle, 1995). Colonel Qadhafi criticised the
population’s resistance to people’s committees as undermining the goals of the
revolution, but for the Libyan people the ostensibly democratic committee system was
merely cosmetic, with real authority vested in the Libyan leader (Allan, 1981). In terms
of Scott’s framework despite the veneer of popular rule in the public transcript the RCC
remained firmly in control, with the non-participation of the population an expression of
their

private

transcript

of

opposition.

The

bifurcation

of

the

formal

political/administrative institutions and extra-legal revolutionary mechanisms of political
control became an enduring feature of Libyan political life through to the present day
(Vandewalle, 2006).

The breakdown of religious and revolutionary legitimacy
Qadhafi’s confrontation with the ulama began in the early 1970s with the ‘Cultural
Revolution’ that sought to replace all existing laws with sharia law, and intensified with
the publication of part one and two of the Green Book over the mid-to-late 1970s 32
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(Harris, 1986; Vandewalle, 1998). The ulama have substantial power in traditional
Islamic societies, being entrusted with the interpretation and administration of sharia, but
their status remains dependent on the government’s attitude toward Islam (Gibrell, 2001).
In Qadhafi’s desire to reform the legal system he attacked Islamic jurisprudence based on
two orthodox Sunni doctrines, the hadith and sunna, as being contrary to the
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After the 1979 split between political and revolutionary authority, the people’s committees remained as
administrative units to implement the decisions of the new political structures, the General People’s
Congress and the Basic People’s Congresses (Vandewalle, 1995, p. 191).
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Under the monarchy the legal system was essentially secular with sharia law only used to deal with
personal matters (Vandewalle, 1995, p. 146).

33

The Green Book is Qadhafi’s ideological primer for Libya’s economic, political, and social structures
based on direct democracy, that is, rule by the people not by representation (Ayoub, 1987, p. 35).
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revolutionary spirit of Islam embodied in Qadhafi’s ‘Third Universal Theory’ 34
(Anderson, 1983; Naur, 1986). Qadhafi demanded the Quran serve as the exclusive
source of religious inspiration and for direct communication between the individual and
God, not through intermediaries such as the ulama (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980;
Vandewalle, 1995). Qadhafi stripped the traditional religious establishment of its power
making them consultants of the courts rather than arbiters of sharia (St John, 2011).
Religion had served as a strong basis for Qadhafi’s original legitimacy, but in alienating
the religious establishment the Libyan leader undermined two sources of political power
as proposed by Sharp - intangible factors and authority.

The release of the Green Book exacerbated tensions between Qadhafi and the ulama,
with the latter arguing that its socialist prescriptions conflicted with the principles of
Islamic law which sanctioned capitalist ideas including private property rights and
inheritance 35 (Allan, 1981; Vandewalle, 1998; Takeyh, 2000). In response to the
criticism of the Green Book Qadhafi strongly attacked the religious scholars, describing
them as a reactionary group who distorted Islam (Deeb & Deeb, 1982; Bearman, 1986;
Harris, 1986). Again, Qadhafi abandoned a historical superstructure of consent,
supplanting it with his own arbitrary religious doctrine. The Libyan population found
Qadhafi’s radical interpretation of Islam disturbing, thus he forfeited his legitimacy as a
representative of Islam as a superstructural node of spontaneous consent, instead
becoming the unifying ideology of the Libyan opposition. Nevertheless, Qadhafi did not
surrender religious legitimacy, regarding the Green Book as the new gospel (Anderson,
1983; Takeyh, 2000).

The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) seemingly brought to power a group of
military men who agreed on the political direction for Libya. In the early days of the
revolution the RCC assumed both executive and legislative functions, and although
Qadhafi was clearly the final arbiter in all decisions every RCC member had some
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Qadhafi has insisted that the Third Universal Theory (TUT) is a common-sense interpretation of Islam.
The TUT was not meant to supplant Islam but instil a new set of laws based on a reinterpretation of the
Quran from which all humankind could benefit. The TUT is explained in the Green Book as an alternative
to capitalism and communism (Anderson, 1983, p. 147; St John, 1983, pp. 475-476; Ayoub, 1987, pp. 35,
87; Takeyh, 2000, p. 156).
35

The ulama’s argument over Quranic interpretations of private property was also motivated in defence of
their waqf, property alienated for the purpose of religious endowment and exempt from traditional
inheritance law and taxation, and the major revenue source of the religious establishment. The socialist
economic reforms effectively nationalised waqf (Bearman, 1986, p. 162; Vandewalle, 1995, pp. 148, 150).
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authority over Libya’s political and economic life (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980; Joffe &
McLachlan, 1982; Obeidi, 2001). Qadhafi dominated the RCC as both a leader and a
psychological guide for its members. Individually, RCC members could not censure the
Colonel but their collective weight placed a restraint on his behaviour (Joffe &
McLachlan, 1982). Behind this facade of cohesion, the RCC split into two distinct
factions: technocrats argued for orderly, well-planned economic and political
modernisation; while revolutionaries sought activist policies sacrificing oil revenues for
Arab unity and other ideological pursuits, with Qadhafi himself seeing Arab unity as the
uncontested objective of the revolution (Vandewalle, 1998; Vandewalle, 2008). In
Scott’s terms, the RCC’s initial public appearance of cohesion belied a private realm in
which consent did not underlie their relationship.

As Qadhafi’s power ascended he became less willing to share collegial authority with the
RCC, and his determination to impose his own vision led to intense conflict manifesting
in a failed coup from within the RCC in August 1975 36

37

(Joffe & McLachlan, 1982; El-

Kikhia, 1997). In the wake of the coup Libya’s technocrats were defeated, clearing the
way for Qadhafi to implement his vision of a stateless society. The failed coup attempt
reinforced Qadhafi’s consolidation of personal control and led to his Declaration of the
Authority of the People on 2 March 1977, creating the Socialist People’s Arab
Jamahiriyya – displacing the RCC and ASU with a new committee system (outlined in
the Green Book) as the core political institutions of the revolution 38 (Joffe & McLachlan,
1982; Obeidi, 2001). Qadhafi had failed to procure ideological consensus from all RCC
members at Gramsci’s superstructural level but had instead asserted his position of
dominance.

Protecting the regime: formal and informal means of power and control
Following the declaration of people’s authority, political control was vested in Basic
People’s Congresses (BPCs) that had gradually replaced the ASU local committees since
36

The 1975 coup arose over intense policy conflict between Qadhafi and a coalition of RCC members
centered around Bashir Hawadi (Chairman of the ASU) and Umar al-Muhayshi (Minister of Planning), in
which the disaffected RCC members accused Qadhafi of monopolizing power at the expense of the RCC.
In December 1969, a coup was instigated by two free officers occupying the positions of minister of
defence and minister of the interior who rejected Qadhafi’s revolutionist vision; both were arrested and
charged (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980, p. 47; Bearman, 1986, p. 148; Vandewalle, 2008, p. 18).
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See Appendix A for the composition of the RCC from 1969 to 1975.
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In place of the RCC, Qadhafi created the General Secretariat of the General People’s Congress, which he
filled with former RCC members with himself as Chairman of the body (El-Kikhia, 1997, p. 54;
Vandewalle, 2008, p. 62).
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1975 (with the older people’s committees as their executive branch), as well as trade
unions, professional associations, and the General People’s Congress (GPC, which will
be discussed shortly) 39 (Vandewalle, 1998; Obeidi, 2001; Al-Werfalli, 2011).
Theoretically, the BPCs were the main decision-making institutions through which
people were involved in the political process at the grass-roots level, where the people
alone were to exercise authority in decision-making – but the reality was, as Qadhafi
acknowledged in the Green Book, “theoretically, this is genuine democracy but
realistically, the strong always rule i.e. the stronger party in the society is the one that
rules” (Qaddafi, 1980, p. 53). Thus the formal political system of popular rule became a
façade behind which Qadhafi and a narrow circle of intimates had ultimate power 40
(International Crisis Group [ICG], 2011a).

In principle, attendance at BPCs was compulsory but despite good attendance during the
early years abstention became the predominate posture (Al-Werfalli, 2011; ICG, 2011a).
Al-Werfalli’s (2011) study found that high attendance during the early years did not stem
from an ideological sense of duty but rather in response to threats that non-attendees
would have no recourse against BPC decisions. Moreover, Al-Werfalli (2011) found
increased use of force accounted for a rise in involuntary attendees too fearful not to
attend. Qadhafi resorted to ‘guided democracy’ in which revolutionary committees (RC)
forced attendance where a lack of revolutionary ideological consensus prevailed (Harris,
1986). More than half of the participants in Al-Werfalli’s research that attended BPCs
did so in response to a potential or direct threat, with the inclination to show false
compliance the predominant attitude (Al-Werfalli, 2011). While many Libyans may have
privately deplored Qadhafi’s revolutionary ideology, they rarely expressed dissent in
public demonstrations (Harris, 1986). As Scott (1990) argues, a regime’s control of the
public transcript can provide a convincing façade of hegemony, but revealing the private
transcript of subordinates – as Al-Werfalli does – can clarify the situation as one of
domination.

39

All citizens over eighteen years of age registered as members of the BPC in their area, and based on
professional and functional categories established themselves into trade unions and professional
associations that operate within the congress/committee system of the Jamahiriyya. Records indicate there
have been between 400-600 BPCs all of which operate in isolation from one another (Joffe & McLachlan,
1982, p. 243; Obeidi, 2001, pp. 142-143; Al-Werfalli, 2011, p. 35; ICG, 2011a, p. 9).
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Since the creation of the BPC system, the only change to the formal political system occurred in October
1998 with the creation of 26 regional units known as sha’abiyat positioned between the BPC and GPC,
each with its own people’s congress and people’s committee with their task to improve the coordination of
local interests an decentralize authority (St John, 2011, p. 76).
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The official separation between political and revolutionary authority was declared at the
General People’s Congress (GPC) on 2 March 1979 and henceforth the GPC seemingly
replaced the RCC as the highest decision-making authority in Libya 41 (Naur, 1986;
Vandewalle, 1995). To further emphasise the distinction between political and
revolutionary authority, Colonel Qadhafi and former RCC members relinquished their
roles as members of the GPC General Secretariat to focus solely on revolutionary
activities, with all top positions within the formal political structure becoming civilian 42
(Vandewalle, 2008; Al-Werfalli, 2011). The GPC was the Libyan equivalent of
Parliament, headed by a Secretary and composed of the secretaries of the BPCs, people’s
committees, the unions, and professional associations in total comprised of around 1,000
delegates who turned local decisions into national resolutions 43 (Obeidi, 2001).

The GPC was charged with appointing secretaries (ministers) to the General People’s
Committee (cabinet) as the highest executive authority headed by a Secretary General
(prime minister), and elected a five-member General Secretariat. The General Secretariat
was responsible for organising the annual two-week long meeting of the GPC, preparing
the GPC’s agenda by soliciting and reviewing GPC delegates’ comments, and
undertaking functions normally reserved for the head of state (Vandewalle, 2008; AlWerfalli, 2011). In theory the GPC had the power to discuss and criticize government
institutions and issue decrees with the force of law, but in reality it was simply a vehicle
through which the Colonel’s decisions were ratified (Al-Werfalli, 2011).

The twenty secretaries of the General People’s Committee were nominated by the
Revolutionary Committees Liaison Bureau (RCLB, to be discussed below), endorsed by
Qadhafi; with the predetermined choices ratified through the GPC electoral process
(Allan, 1981; Obeidi, 2001; Al-Werfalli, 2011). While the General People’s Committee
had to explain their policies to the GPC when requested, it did not take orders from GPC
delegates who were simply messengers of their respective BPC (Joffe & McLachlan,
1982). The participants in Al-Werfalli’s study overwhelmingly mistrusted the GPC and
41

In January 1976, the ASU Congress was renamed the General People’s Congress (GPC) to reflect the
new congress/committee system (Bearman, 1986, p. 149; Vandewalle, 1998, p. 96).
42

From March 1979 Colonel Qadhafi never again occupied any formal political position with his post
stationed above the political fray in the role of ‘Leader or Guide of the Revolution’ (Joffe & McLachlan,
1982, p. 243; Al-Werfalli, 2011, p. 35).
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See Appendix B for a diagram of the structure of the people’s authority system.
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the General People’s Committee perceiving these governmental bodies as unreliable,
given regime loyalty was the basis for appointment (Al-Werfalli, 2011). For many
Libyans, these political institutions were the domain of regime stalwarts, and nothing
more than talking shops tasked with implementing arbitrary decisions made by Qadhafi
(ICG, 2011a). In a Gramscian sense the Colonel arbitrarily imposed the GPC on the
Libyan population, and while the GPC publicly purported to be an institution of
collaborative and consensual decision-making, the private reality was that it served
Qadhafi and perpetuated his rule through domination.

In accordance with Qadhafi’s Green Book declaration “committees everywhere”
(Qaddafi, 1980, p. 35) in the late-1970s revolutionary committees (RC) were formed in
businesses, educational institutions, and the armed forces, with an RC unit built into
every BPC, people’s committee, professional association, and other state institutions
(Naur, 1986; Vandewalle, 1995; Obeidi, 2001). The revolutionary committees had two
main functions: to mobilise the masses toward political participation and to serve as
watchdogs within the formal political structures to prevent any deviation from
revolutionary ideology44 (Vandewalle, 1995; El-Kikhia, 1997; Al-Werfalli, 2011). After
the separation of political and revolutionary authority in March 1979, Qadhafi appointed
the RCs ‘gatekeepers’ of the BPCs, now considered inefficient and hostile to political
innovation (Vandewalle, 1995). The RCs monitored BPC agendas; censored proposals
that conflicted with revolutionary programs and the Green Book; guided elections for the
leadership of BPCs in which RC members were predominantly recruited; and gathered
intelligence against enemies of the revolution (Naur, 1986; Obeidi, 2001; Vandewalle,
2008). In Sharp’s terms, the Libyan leader used the RCs to acquire ‘intimidated’ consent
where ‘free’ consent was not forthcoming.

Between 1979 and 1987 the revolutionary committees were the single most powerful
group within Libya, and understanding the allure of power Qadhafi did not permit the
RCs to organise activities themselves, nor were they allowed to contact one another; all
RCs reported to the Revolutionary Committees Liaison Bureau (RCLB) held directly
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In 1979, the Revolutionary Committees established a weekly newspaper entitled al-Zahf al-Akhdar or
The Green March, followed in 1980 by al-Jamahiriyya in which newly founded committees were regularly
announced (Vandewalle, 1995, p. 95; Obeidi, 2001, pp. 145-146).
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responsible to Qadhafi 45 (Vandewalle, 1995; El-Kikhia, 1997; Vandewalle, 1998).
Nevertheless by December 1988, in the context of growing public dissatisfaction with the
economy, Qadhafi publicly curtailed the RCs’ role as their continued misuse of power in
violently pursuing anti-revolutionaries had become counterproductive to encouraging
meaningful popular participation (Vandewalle, 1995; Obeidi, 2001). However, Qadhafi
did not abolish the RCs entirely and in the mid-1990s they were rehabilitated to provide
Qadhafi with moral and physical support against opposition movements (El Kikhia,
1997; St John, 2011). In May 2002, there were an estimated 60,000 revolutionary
committee members in Libya (Vandewalle, 2008). With revolutionary ideology proving
an insufficient mechanism for mobilization, Qadhafi exercised domination over the
Libyan population through the RCs. As Gramsci asserted, where the creation of genuine
hegemony fails the state will revert to reliance on its coercive apparatus constructed in
anticipation when ‘spontaneous’ consent declines (Bates, 1975).

The Revolutionary Committees’ membership was not electorally based but available to
anyone who believed in the revolutionary ideology codified in Qadhafi’s Green Book
(Obeidi, 2001). Graduates of political indoctrination camps in which the regime hardcore
imparted revolutionary knowledge provided initial membership of the RCs, with
subsequent members undertaking Green Book courses after RC membership was granted
(Vandewalle, 1995; Vandewalle, 1998). RC members were largely motivated to join by
ideology, including loyalty to the charismatic figure of Qadhafi, but some members had
joined opportunistically hoping to improve their economic and social standing (AlWerfalli, 2011). Al-Werfalli’s (2011) survey asked respondents to identify if they were
members of the RCs, given the RC movement was the sole mechanism through which
individuals were allowed to exercise revolutionary activism (Vandewalle, 1995, p. 94).

The results of Al-Werfalli’s study revealed that 62.3 percent of the population never
joined the RCs, but of those who did the incentives and benefits attached to RC
membership was a strong inducement (El-Kikhia, 1997; Al-Werfalli, 2011).
Furthermore, Al-Werfalli was able to classify RC members into three distinct groups:
pro-regime wing who supported Qadhafi unconditionally; reform wing forming a small
proportion of the survey sample, who supported Qadhafi so long as his directives
45

Prior to the RCs curtailment, several members of the Revolutionary Committees Liaision Bureau
(RCLB) were appointed secretaries (ministers) of the General People’s Committee of the GPC
(Vandewalle, 1998, p. 102).
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enhanced ‘direct democracy’; and withdrawal wing who abandoned the RC movement
because their values conflicted with the revolutionary leadership (Al-Werfalli, 2011).
Despite pro-regime wing support, the data revealed that pro-regime political activities
were exceptionally low, with RC support most evident in the BPCs where approximately
90.6 percent participated occasionally or regularly (Al-Werfalli, 2011). Qadhafi’s
revolutionary ideology was even unable to fully penetrate the superstructure of his
supposed adherents, where a performance of consent in the public transcript belied
opportunistic content in the private transcript.

A socialist economy, economic sanctions and failed reforms
Guided by the second part of Qadhafi’s Green Book – on the ‘solution to the economic
problem’ – by the end of the 1970s a socialist transformation had drastically modified
Libya’s long-standing economic structures (St John, 2011). These socialist developments
conflicted with Libya’s virtually homogenous commitment to orthodox Islamic values
(which sanctioned capitalist ideas); replaced by Qadhafi’s own idiosyncratic Islamic
vision (Vandewalle, 1995). Nevertheless, with Libyans largely depoliticized and passive
beneficiaries of economic largesse, Qadhafi’s monopoly of oil revenues allowed him to
pursue ideological economic policies without seeking popular endorsement (Vandewalle,
1998; Takeyh, 2000; Vandewalle, 2006). Beginning in 1978 a series of socialist reforms
was initiated starting with Qadhafi’s dictum “no wage-earners, but partners” (Qaddafi,
1980, p. 66) – encouraging workers to take over the running of their workplaces, with
some 180 takeovers completed by the end of the year 46 (Deeb & Deeb, 1982). Moreover,
new guidelines for property rights granted ownership of all tenanted properties to their
occupants – Libyan families thereafter only being allowed to own one house,
undermining the economic power of real estate investors 47 (Naur, 1986; Vandewalle,
1995; Al-Werfalli, 2011).

The demonetisation of banknotes above one Libyan dinar in 1980 successfully
encouraged those with cash hoards to deposit them in nationalized banks, increasing
government control over private assets (Allen, 1981). However, the most profound
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This was a more radical change than the 1973 ‘popular or cultural revolution’ workers take over in
which workers were eligible to receive a share of annual profits if their enterprise employed more than 10
workers and if annual profits exceeded LD 4,000 (Deeb & Deeb, 1982, pp. 115-116).
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The new owners had to pay a mortgage in monthly instalments constituting only a third of the former
rent, with former landlords granted compensation payments over a period of years (Deeb & Deeb, 1982, p.
116).
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socialist prescription was the elimination of private commerce, wholesale as well as
retail, being replaced by a centrally controlled economy (St John, 1983; St John, 2011).
The state owned all banking, insurance and other major services, was in charge of
agriculture, manufacturing, imports and exports, with state-run supermarkets established
in 1981 as the sole distribution centres for all basic commodities (Naur, 1986;
Vandewalle, 1995). These socialist reforms disenfranchised a substantial section of the
population, particularly the ‘new capitalists’ who prospered under the early days of the
regime (Deeb & Deeb, 1982; St John, 1983). In Sharp’s terms Qadhafi’s control of the
country’s material resources provided him with his main source of political power and
seeming consent, but in a Gramscian sense true hegemony goes beyond consensus of the
economic structure.

In Qadhafi’s attempt to implement ‘Islamic socialism’ it became evident that Libya’s
human resources were not being equally developed (Harris, 1986). By 1975 every sector
of the workforce largely depended on foreign labour, with 58 percent of expatriate
personnel holding professional and managerial positions, while foreign workers
comprised 41 percent of the service sector (Bearman, 1986). The oil industry, accounting
for almost 99 percent of Libya’s capital inflows, only employed one percent of the active
Libyan population – largely relying on a more technically savvy expatriate workforce.
Meanwhile the stagnant public sector accounted for 70-75 percent of Libyan employment
(Allan, 1981; Naur, 1986; Vandewalle, 2006). With the private sector eliminated and the
State the sole economic provider, the Libyan population was consigned to unproductive,
rent-seeking activities (Vandewalle, 2006).

In principle the Green Book’s directives entrusted economic authority to the people’s
congresses and committees, with Qadhafi often stating he was no longer responsible for
economic decisions, now the people’s responsibility (Vandewalle, 2008). In reality the
people’s congresses and committees did not seriously debate economic policies but
served as a facade behind which a handful of officials and technocrats linked to the
Libyan leader intervened extensively in the economy, making decisions on national
economic development unobstructed by the purchased passivity of the population
(Vandewalle, 1995; Vandewalle, 1998; Takeyh, 2000). Qadhafi arbitrarily changed the
economic structure rendering the Libyan population economically superfluous, and
although Qadhafi’s control of the country’s main resource purchased behavioural
compliance it did not convert into ideological consensus.
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As global oil prices and Libyan exports declined during the 1980s, Libya experienced a
serious recession that reduced the regime’s ability to purchase popular consent (Takeyh,
2000; St John, 2011). Libya’s oil revenues dropped from $22 billion in 1980 to $5.4
billion in 1986, and oil production decreased and steadied at 1.0 million bpd from 1983
onwards, compared to the previous average of 1.8 million bdp in 1980 48 (Bearman, 1986;
Vandewalle, 1995; St John, 2011). In response, the regime implemented austerity
measures that had severe economic consequences. The expulsion of foreign workers
severely interrupted food supplies and brought the services sector to a screaming halt
(Vandewalle, 1995; St John, 2011). Prices of basic commodities doubled as state-run
supermarkets suffered endemic shortages, and popular discontent rose as the inefficient
and corrupt distributive system virtually collapsed (Bearman, 1986; Harris, 1986). While
some Libyans expressed anger and discontent at the economic turmoil through
anonymous acts of vandalism, and grumbling, the majority of Libyans accepted their
reduced economic circumstances with passive anger (Harris, 1986; Al-Werfalli, 2011).
As Scott asserts, while public grumbling stops short of making an explicit statement of
opposition, it provides evidence of an individual’s private transcript of dissent without
provoking retaliation from an authoritarian regime.

The failure of Qadhafi’s distributive policies continued to erode the Libyan leader’s
legitimacy, but sensitive to increasing internal discontent Qadhafi announced an infitah
(liberalization) in late 1987, reintroducing private sector initiatives to significantly cut
state spending (Vandewalle, 1995; Vandewalle, 2006). The liberalization attempt proved
difficult as Libya lacked the necessary institutions of a modern state, neglected in the
pursuance of ‘statelessness’ (Vandewalle, 1995). In the early 1990s another liberalization
effort was instigated but was implemented half-heartedly, with most Libyans unwilling
to participate in an uncertain economic climate where growth only proceeded at 0.8
percent annually49 (St John, 2011). Qadhafi ruled by purchasing popular compliance but
48

Two factors exacerbated the decline in export earnings: In 1981, Libya’s share of the oil market shrank
as Libyan crude was priced $4 higher compared to other exporters such as Saudi Arabia which expanded
production from 8.5 million bpd to 10.3 million bpd creating a glut in the world market (Bearman, 1986, p.
268). Moreover, the trade sanctions imposed by the United States in March 1982 in response to Qadhafi’s
alleged support of global terrorism, restricted US companies from exporting Libyan crude oil which
accounted for 35 percent of Libya’s oil exports, and banned the import of American oil and gas machinery
to Libya (Bearman, 1986, p. 268; St John, 2011, p. 95).
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Adding to Libya’s economic woes, on 15 April 1992 and tightened in November 1993, the United
Nations imposed sanctions on Libya that included a ban on air links with Libya, an embargo on the sale of
aircraft, military and petroleum equipment and the freezing of Libyan assets overseas. The sanctions were
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with the collapse of the economic structure and failing to institutionalise his socialist
ideology within the superstructure, Qadhafi predominantly utilised coercion to perpetuate
his rule with passive anger bubbling away in the private transcript of the Libyan
population.

The state coercive apparatus
Gramsci (Bates, 1975) asserts that when ‘organic crisis’ occurs whereby hegemony is
absent from both the structure and superstructure the dominant group will resort to rule
through force. In Libya Gramsci’s assertion was validated, as when revolutionary
hegemony as embodied in the Green Book failed at both levels, the Libyan leader
prevailed upon a pervasive security apparatus to prolong his rule. The military provided
the main source of coercive power in the early days but, wanting to counterweight the
military’s power which represented the most serious threat to Qadhafi’s authority (to be
discussed in chapter four), the Libyan leader established a multi-layered and overlapping
network of security organizations that were carefully controlled to limit any vertical or
lateral bases of oppositional power forming (Vandewalle, 1995; El-Kikhia, 1997;
Vandewalle, 2006).

The revolutionary committees discussed previously were the embodiment of the regime’s
coercive apparatus. Particularly throughout the 1980s and 1990s RC members staffing
revolutionary courts, not bound by the country’s penal code, were involved in numerous
arrests, tortures and public executions against individuals involved in anti-revolutionary
activities 50 (Vandewalle, 2008; Al-Werfalli, 2011). Although the visible public profile of
the RCs was curtailed, they remained a core component of Qadhafi’s revolutionary
apparatus (Vandewalle, 1995). In June 1990 Qadhafi created the People’s Guard as a
visible deterrent to counter increasing Islamic agitation. In September 1994 the Colonel
established cleansing or purification committees whose official duties included
identification and elimination of counterrevolutionaries (St John, 2011).

initiated after Libya failed to cooperate with officials investigating the December 1988, Pan Am flight 103
that exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland killing 259 passengers and 11 people on the ground, and nine
months later the UTA flight 772 that exploded over Niger killing 179 passengers. The sanctions were
permanently lifted in September 2003 after the trial of the two Libyan suspects in the Lockerbie case had
concluded (St John, 2011, p. 98).
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The RCs were also involved in the killing of dissidents, a spectacular case occurring in 1984 when
Libyan dissidents peacefully protesting against the Qadhafi regime outside the Libyan People’s Bureau
(Libyan embassy staffed by RC members) in London were fired upon resulting in several casualties
including the death of British police officer, Yvonne Fletcher (St John, 2008).
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Other security institutions included the Military Secret Service, the Jamahiriyya Security
Organization, the World Centre for the Fight Against Imperialism, Racism and Fascism
(involved in the persecution of Libyan’s in exile during the 1980s), and the Intelligence
Bureau of the Leader located within the Bab al-Aziziyya military compound that also
served as Qadhafi’s residence (Vandewalle, 2006). Beyond these formal security organs
Qadhafi relied on relatives, members of his tribe (the Qadhafa) and affiliated tribes to fill
important and sensitive positions to safeguard the Colonel and his regime (El-Kikhia,
1997; Vandewalle, 2006; ICG, 2011a). The fact that all security sector institutions
remained outside the Jamahiriyya’s people’s committee and congress system indicated
that ultimate control remained firmly within Qadhafi’s grip, where domination prevailed
over consent (Vandewalle, 2006).

Qadhafi’s abandonment of the tribe and Islam as two organic superstructures of consent
forfeited access to mechanisms of ‘spontaneous’ or ‘free’ consent, with the Colonel
instead implementing successive arbitrary political institutions that failed to generate
popular participation. Additionally, the imposition of his Green Book ideology was
unsuccessful in establishing revolutionary legitimacy at the superstructural level (even
failing to some degree within the RCC and RCs, which embodied revolutionary
authority). Nevertheless, access to substantial capital inflows enabled the Libyan leader
to purchase the Libyan population’s political acquiescence (although this proved more
difficult during a recession and under sanctions), which along with coercion and force
produced a façade of behavioural compliance and seeming hegemony in the public
transcript. In Sharp’s terms this would be considered ‘intimidated’ consent, while
Gramsci would argue that the state was ruling through domination given ‘spontaneous’
consent had failed. While overt expressions of opposition by the Libyan population were
minimal thus supporting a public transcript of hegemony, this apparent consent belied a
private transcript in which Libyans’ passive anger was injected into the public transcript
in the form of non-participation or anonymous acts of opposition, challenging the picture
of hegemony into one of resistance to domination as suspected by Scott.
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Chapter Four: The 2011 revolution - a search for the sources of violence
“He will never let go of his power,” said one, Abdel Rahman. “This is
a dictator, an emperor. He will die before he gives an inch. But we are
no longer afraid. We are ready to die after what we have seen”
(Cited in New York Times, 21 February 2011)

That Libyans chose 17 February 2011 as their ‘Day of Rage’ was not just a reaction to
the prevailing events in North Africa in which long-standing dictatorships in Tunisia and
Egypt were overthrown 51. The date marked the fifth anniversary of a brutal crackdown
on a public protest in Benghazi in 2006 (Amnesty International [AI], 2011). This chapter
brings together the analysis of the deep historical superstructures of consent, specifically
the tribe and Islam, and the examination of Qadhafi’s policies of rule through
domination, having failed to capitalise on organic consensual superstructures or imbed
revolutionary legitimacy. These elements will be discussed within the context of Libya’s
recent history and the events of the 2011 uprising to explain why violent rebellion
against the regime arose, and how these factors precluded nonviolent action in the way
Gene Sharp advocates.

Recent events leading to the 2011 revolution
On 17 February 2006 a crowd of 1,000 protesters set fire to the Italian consulate in Libya
protesting against Italian minister Roberto Calderoli for wearing a t-shirt displaying a
Danish cartoon satirising the Prophet Muhammad, originally published in September
2005 (BBC, 18 February 2006; St John, 2008; Christian Science Monitor [CSM], 17
February 2011). The International Crisis Group (2011a) suggests that the originally
regime-orchestrated demonstration against the cartoon turned into an anti-regime protest,
while Amnesty International (2011) maintain that the violence was simply anger about
the cartoon, rather than being against Qadhafi. Nevertheless, Libyan security forces
deployed to suppress the violence, killing at least 12 protesters (AI, 2011; BBC, 18
February 2006; CSM, 17 February 2011). As usual, the Qadhafi government held nobody
responsible for the protesters deaths, with any criticism of security forces silenced (AI,
51

On 1 February 2011, Jamal al-Hajii, a Libyan writer and political commentator imprisoned by the regime
in 2009 and 2010, was arrested by Qadhafi’s security forces over an alleged car accident but is believed to
have been in relation to his calls for peaceful demonstrations to take place in Libya similar to the recent
protests in Tunisia and Egypt (Amnesty International News, 5 February 2011; Amnesty International
News, 8 February 2011).
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2011). The following year the regime became aware of demonstrations planned for the
anniversary, they thus banned all gatherings without regime approval, arresting,
detaining incommunicado, and eventually sentencing the activists to prison terms ranging
from six to 25 years for attempting to overthrow the political system (AI, 2011). For the
International Crisis Group (2011b) Benghazi’s tradition of activism, which had
resurfaced during the 2006 anti-cartoon protests, made it a natural epicentre for the 2011
uprising.

Despite the Libyan population’s catalogue of grievances it was a group called the Abu
Salim Families, relatives of victims of the 1996 Abu Salim prison massacre, which
sparked the 2011 uprising (Amnesty International News [AIN], 16 February 2011). On
28 June 1996 guards at Tripoli’s Abu Salim prison (notorious for holding opposition
activists) fired on inmates protesting poor living conditions, killing over a dozen and
wounding several more (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2003). Top security officials,
including Qadhafi’s brother-in-law Abdullah Sanussi, ordered a ceasefire and opened
negotiations while dead prisoners were removed and the injured supposedly taken to
hospital (HRW, 2003; AIN, 26 September 2011). Instead, the injured were probably
executed, and the following morning prisoners were forced into the courtyards where
guards killed an estimated 1,200 of the prison’s 1,700 inmates with grenades and heavy
machine-gun fire (HRW, 2003). For six years the Libyan regime denied the massacre,
then in 2002 began informing some families of inmate deaths without returning the
bodies or indicating how they had died (HRW, 2003; CSM, 2 September 2011).

Since 2002, lawyers representing the Abu Salim Families had become the regime’s most
vocal opponents, so the arrest of lawyers Fathi Terbil and Fraj Esharani two days before
protests planned for 17 February 2011 led hundreds of protesters to gather outside a
security forces building to demand their release (AIN, 16 February 2011; CSM, 16
February 2011; CSM, 2 September 2011). The lawyers were released the next day but
peaceful protests continued with demonstrators calling for Qadhafi’s resignation,
resulting in security forces using tear gas and water cannons to disperse them (AI, 2011;
AIN, 16 February 2011; CSM, 17 February 2011). Following his release Fathi Terbil
stated:

We, the Abu Salim families, ignited the revolution … The Libyan people were
ready to rise up because of the injustice they experienced in their lives but they
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needed a cause. So calling for the release of people … became the justification
for their protest. (Oakes, 2011, pp. 224-225)

The 2011 revolution
The ‘Day of Rage’ in Benghazi and the eastern city al-Bayda started in tense
circumstances but proceeded as relatively coordinated peaceful demonstrations,
resembling the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt (CSM, 17 February 2011; New York
Times [NYT], 22 February 2011). While overwhelmingly nonviolent, aside from a few
protesters throwing stones at security forces buildings, Libyan security personnel
retaliated violently – firing live ammunition into the crowds, killing up to 24 protesters
and injuring scores (AI, 2011; CSM, 18 February 2011). Some protesters thus became
involved in violent confrontations with security forces, with reports of 170 civilians
killed and more than 1,500 injured in Benghazi and al-Bayda between 16 and 21
February (AI, 2011). Incensed by the brutal crackdown, over the coming days
spontaneous protests swiftly erupted across the country outrunning efforts to coordinate
them.

Uprisings spread widely, from Nalut and Zintan in the mountains; to al-Zawiya and
Zuwara in the west; to Kufra in the south-east; and Misratah (Libya’s third city, located
between Benghazi and Tripoli). The protesters set fire to buildings symbolic of state
repression and unrest evolved into armed conflict at alarming speed, with the death toll
(in addition to the Benghazi and al-Bayda death toll) climbing to 109 over a three-day
period (AI, 2011; ICG, 2011a). In Tripoli the protests lagged behind, but by 21 February
2011 protesters converged on the central Green Square (a symbol of Qadhafi’s power
adorned by huge posters of the Colonel) where security forces opened fire on them (AI,
2011). Witnesses stated that heavily armed regime forces and African mercenaries were
thick in the streets of Tripoli, roving in trucks and firing indiscriminately (NYT, 21
February 2011; NYT, 22 February 2011). As one protester stated:

It is too late … I don’t think anyone is prepared to listen to Qaddafi anymore, and
it is not one town or one area. It is the whole country in an uprising. (New York
Times, 22 February 2011, p. 4)
Qadhafi initially denied the protests, asserting “there are ‘no demonstrations at all in the
streets’ and that ‘all my people are with me, they love me.’” (CSM, 1 March 2011, p. 3).
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However, unable to suppress the uprising Qadhafi became defiant stating, “I will fight on
to the last drop of my blood” (NYT, 22 February 2011, p. 2) and threatening to “purge
Libya inch by inch, room by room, household by household, alley by alley, and
individual by individual until the country is purified” (AI, 2011, p. 16). By late February
violence had erupted across the country, diminishing any chance of a nonviolent
resolution. Through its actions and declarations, Qadhafi’s regime had made it clear that
nonviolent resistance was futile and the Libyan leader would ‘fight to the death’. In
Sharp’s theoretical terms the Libyan population had withdrawn consent, with the failure
of nonviolent action potentially attributable to an absence of sufficient ‘loci of power’
through which to spread adequate training in nonviolent technique; unlike in Egypt
where Sharp’s scholarship had been disseminated prior to using nonviolence. However,
in reality and in a Gramscian sense, Qadhafi had not actually established hegemony
where active consent must be imbedded at the superstructural level, and had instead ruled
through domination for over four decades – thus it was the absence of consent (meaning
there was no consent to withdraw) that goes toward explaining the failure of Sharp’s
nonviolent technique.

A defiant military
Unlike the Tunisian and Egyptian militaries whose tradition of non-partisan loyalty to
state institutions allowed them to play mediatory roles in their own Arab Spring
uprisings, the Libyan military had no such identity and had been kept deliberately
fractured and weak by a suspicious Qadhafi (CSM, 22 February 2011; CSM, 1 March
2011; ICG, 2011a). Not long after assuming power Qadhafi sought to counteract the
power of the military, which he perceived as threatening his authority 52. In addition to
purging the military of individuals suspected of disloyalty and regularly rotating highranking military personnel, Qadhafi abandoned professional and technical criteria as the
basis for military recruitment (Harris, 1986; Vandewalle, 1995). Loyalty superseded
competence creating two groups within the armed forces: ‘professionals’, who were
generally non-political; and ‘loyalists’ originating within the RCC and the Free Officers,
who overtly supported the regime (Vandewalle, 1995; Vandewalle, 2008).
52

To augment and offset the military the 1973 popular revolution called for the creation of a people’s
militia, primarily used to guard public buildings and man remote checkpoints, to be placed under the
control of the RCC and independent of the army and police. In 1979 conscription and military training
compulsory for all young people was introduced with the goal of replacing the traditional military with a
popular military force. Neither initiative was ever able to unseat the military (El Fathaly & Palmer, 1980.
p. 122; St John, 2011, p. 63).
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To supplement and counterweight the loyalists Qadhafi relied heavily on expatriate
armed forces from East Germany, Syria and Cuba – further dividing the military
(Vandewalle, 1995; Takeyh, 2000). The military was thus never assigned to safeguard
the regime, the domain of Qadhafi’s special security forces, which were always stronger
than the regular army (ICG, 2011a). Additionally, rank did not ensure actual influence,
with loyalty to the revolution and membership of Qadhafi’s tribe determining
appointment to sensitive security and army positions (El-Kikhia, 1997; Vandewalle,
2008). Despite Qadhafi’s measures the military remained the one institution that
threatened Qadhafi’s power – manifest in numerous coup and assassination attempts
against the Colonel (Harris, 1986; Takeyh, 2000). The military reflected the discontent
felt toward the revolutionary regime and served as a breeding ground for
counterrevolutionaries (Naur, 1986). In a Gramscian sense while the military remained a
superstructure of political society, rather than it serving as an institution through which to
imbed revolutionary ideology, it was utilised as a vehicle of opposition and a source of
violence against the regime.

The dislocation and discontentment of the Libyan armed forces set the stage for heavy
defections during the 2011 Libyan uprising (NYT, 22 February 2011). Forces of the
former Libyan National Army abandoned their uniforms to join the rebels, whereby late
February roughly 8,000 soldiers were reported to have defected (ICG, 2011b). The
majority of military defections occurred in the eastern capital of Benghazi, the rebel
army’s headquarters, while defectors in Tripoli and other western cities joined local
military brigades (ICG, 2011b). The military’s indignation toward the revolutionary
regime’s tactics was evidenced at the Tobruk command where Major General Suleiman
Mahmoud refused to follow regime orders to fire on demonstrators. His aide, Major
Salma Faraj Issa, recalled that, “‘This was something impossible for us,’ … ‘We were
being asked to fire on our brothers, our sisters, we decided to stand with the people’”
(CSM, 24 February 2011, p. 2).

A major indication of the regime’s diminishing legitimacy was the defection of General
Abdul Fatah Younis who had been Qadhafi’s interior minister and an original member of
the RCC. Younis was dispatched to Benghazi to suppress armed protesters but instead
defected becoming military commander of the rebel forces (ICG, 2011b; CSM, 1 March
2011; CSM, 25 August 2011). Nevertheless, on 28 July 2011 Younis was assassinated
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with the perpetrators believed to be either Islamists within the rebel forces or Qadhafi
security forces (CSM, 25 August 2011; Oakes, 2011). The predominant role of the armed
forces in the 2011 uprising ensured there was little chance the conflict would be resolved
non-violently. Unlike Sharp’s nonviolent protesters who are trained to control anger and
fear and direct that energy into a nonviolent power, the opposite is true of the army
which provides discipline in warfare, where individual weaknesses like fear and the
instinct of flight are instead channelled toward violent action (Gregg, 1935; Sharp, 1973).
Additionally, in Sharp’s theoretical terms General Younis (as interior minister and
original member of the RCC – the embodiment of the One September Revolution) had in
the public transcript actively consented to the revolutionary ideology. However, in a
Gramscian sense Younis’ defection provides evidence to counter ideological consent at
the superstructural level (which could simply have been opportunistic consent) and
confirmation of covert resistance in the private transcript, supporting Scott’s assertion
that apparent consent in the public transcript can mask resistance to domination in the
private transcript.

Tribe and Islam as superstructures of resistance
Tribalism runs deep in Libyan history, with no greater example than the tribes’ resistance
to Italian colonialism (CSM, 25 August 2011). Despite the revolutionary regime’s initial
hostility towards tribalism and attempts to eliminate it, in the face of increasing
discontent in the 1990s Qadhafi turned to the tribes as a tool of socialisation to maintain
his power (Obeidi, 2001; St John, 2011). In Gramscian terms, the tribe is an organic
superstructure of consent in civil society and the site of hegemonic leadership, and will
not be easily destroyed through the introduction of arbitrary structures that typically have
a limited lifespan (Bocock, 1986, Forgacs, 1999). Tribal identity proved impervious to
the regime’s interference, evidenced in studies by El Fathaly and Palmer (1980) in 1973
and Obeidi (2001) in 1994, which found that tribal identity and loyalty remained very
strong.

Given the strength of tribalism, in July 1994 Qadhafi incorporated the tribes into the
political structure by establishing the people’s social leadership committees (PSLCs)
comprised of tribal leaders, heads of families and other prominent local officials 53. The
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In 1996, the PSLCs were brought into a national organization with members of local PSLCs sent to the
national PSLC. The national committee was directed by a general coordinator, a position typically held by
high-ranking military personnel for six-month terms. In March 2000, Qadhafi suggested that the general
coordinator should be considered the formal head of state, in effect, his successor. Then in October 2009,
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PSLCs were tasked with the distribution of state subsidies and maintaining social
stability through the prevention of opposition, increasing kingship’s importance as a
source of safety and support, and a mechanism through which to access distributive
networks (Vandewalle, 2006; Obeidi, 2011; St John, 2011). Nevertheless, the practical
reality of encouraging the PSLCs allowed Qadhafi to use the tribal system to his
advantage, offering economic privileges and other advantages to tribes that were loyal
and punishing those that were not, thus agitating intra-tribal rivalries (Telegraph, 4
March 2011; CSM, 25 August 2011). In a 1992 interview with Muhammad Ibn Ghalbun
founder of the exiled opposition group the Libyan Constitutional Union, he stated, “were
Qadhafi to fall, neither the exiled secular opposition nor internal Islamist activists would
prevail; instead, a civil war between or among various tribal factions was likely to
develop” (Vandewalle, 1995, p. 230).

With a history of tribal violence, and an environment of simmering tribal tensions,
nonviolent collaboration was improbable. Nonetheless, during the 2011 uprising Libya’s
biggest tribe the Warfalla abandoned the Qadhafi regime – evidence of a private
transcript of simmering tribal animosity injected into the public transcript (Telegraph, 4
March 2011). Other tribes also joined the anti-government side in violent conflict, with
the eastern Agouri tribe’s leader Mohamed El Deeb stating, “For 42 years, Qaddafi put
hatred between the tribes. But this is the first time they feel like they are working
together” (CSM, 25 August 2011, p. 3). Despite the revolutionary regime’s attempts to
manipulate and subvert the tribal system, the tribe remained a persistent feature of
Libyan society supporting Gramsci’s assertion that organic historical superstructures are
not easily extinguished and continue to serve as mechanisms of ideological consent even
when arbitrary structures seek to replace them. This upholds Sharp’s theory that
intangible factors can provide a source of consensually based political power.
Nevertheless, where a ruling group abandons an organic superstructure it will no longer
provide a source of political power, instead becoming a weapon of resistance for
subordinate groups – manifest in overt resistance in the public transcript and/or covert
resistance in the private transcript, however it does not then follow that these organic
superstructures of opposition will support nonviolent principles.

Qadhafi urged the national PSLC to appoint his son Saif al-Islam al-Qaddafi as general coordinator with no
term limit (St John, 2011, p. 75).
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Islam as a historical superstructure of consent, or what Sharp terms an intangible factor
of political power, remains a primary unit of loyalty and identity in Libyan society. Islam
nurtured resistance against foreign rule during the colonial war, and it played a similar
role under Qadhafi’s authoritarian rule (Harris, 1986; Obeidi, 2001). In a society like
Libya where Islam has played a prominent role in shaping beliefs, values and attitudes,
Qadhafi’s increasingly radical interpretation of Islam set him at odds with both the
religious establishment and the Libyan population, ensuring that Islam became a weapon
of violent resistance rather than a source of political consent for the regime (Anderson,
1983; Vandewalle, 1995).

Islamic opposition intensified during the 1980s and 1990s to which Qadhafi took a zerotolerance approach, declaring opponents “more dangerous than AIDS” (Vandewalle,
1995, p. 109). Nonetheless, under Qadhafi’s tenure several Islamic opposition groups
were established, the most prominent being: the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG),
born in Afghanistan in the early-1990s (which numerous individuals killed during the
Abu Salim massacre belonged to); and the Libyan Islamic Group (the Muslim
Brotherhood’s local branch – established in Egypt in 1928 and brought to Libya by
Egyptian teachers and students) 54 (Vandewalle, 2008; Al-Werfalli, 2011; ICG, 2011a).
Other Islamic opposition groups included the Islamic Liberation Movement and the
Islamic Martyrs’ Movement, both of which supported a jihadist culture and were
proficient and committed practitioners of violence (Takeyh, 2000).

While militant Islamists were a source of annoyance for the Libyan leader, by the end of
the 1990s Qadhafi had successfully suppressed them, aided by their own internal
divisions that prevented a united front (Takeyh, 2000; Al-Werfalli, 2011). Despite the
absence of continued Islamic opposition within Libya, Islamic resistance remained active
outside the country (Vandewalle, 2008; St John, 2011). Although Islam provides a node
of consent within Libyan society, which in a Gramscian sense performs as an organic
ideological superstructure of consent and in Sharp’s terminology as a loci of power to
control the authority of the ruling group, with LIFG adherents trained to “get into knife
fights and other situations involving extreme and life-threatening violence” (Vandewalle,
2008, p. 96) it would not serve as a source of nonviolent resistance during the 2011
uprising.
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In March 2011, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group changed its name to the Libyan Islamic Movement
for Change (ICG, 2011b).

51

Economic and political opposition
Despite Libya’s relative economic security compared to other North African countries it
is understood that grievances over corruption, unemployment and poverty propelled the
17 February 2011 ‘Day of Rage’ (AI, 2011; ICG, 2011a). Over recent decades average
Libyan living standards were eroded, leaving Libyans exasperated over what they
perceive as years of poorly planned, piecemeal development of a country that “given a
population of a mere six million … ought to resemble Dubai” (ICG, 2011a, p. 2). During
the 2000s the regime promoted economic liberalization but it did not induce the
anticipated economic revival, where after almost four decades under a socialist command
economy crude oil continued to account for 95 percent of exports and 70-80 percent of
government revenues with private investment dormant at around two percent of GNP
(Takeyh, 2000; St John, 2011).

Despite Libya’s economic wealth a majority of Libyans work at least two jobs, one
typically in the public sector accounting for 75 percent of employment where salaries
remain pitiful and irregular, while approximately 30 percent of the Libyan population is
unemployed or underemployed leaving a massive untapped labour pool (Takeyh, 2000;
ICG, 2011a; St John, 2011). The reduced standard of living, the employment situation
and an increasingly expensive cost of living fuelled the epidemic of corruption rife across
state enterprises (Al-Werfalli, 2011; St John, 2011). Corruption has been justified as
rightfully restoring to the Libyan people what was stolen from them by the state, with
one of Al-Werfalli’s research participants stating “By stealing the thief’s money, you are
not committing a crime, you are getting back your stolen money” (Al-Werfalli, 2011, p.
83). Contrary to Sharp’s (1973) assertion that a ruler’s political power can be restrained
through the withdrawal of consent of a country’s human resources, in Libya where the
major material resource was controlled by Qadhafi and where the majority of the
population was superfluous to economic growth, they were deprived of targets of
nonviolent resistance to influence the economic base.

Both Obeidi (2001) and Al-Werfalli’s (2011) research found that while numerous
respondents desired political change and wanted to contribute to the change process, they
felt they had no capacity to influence the system through the basic people’s congresses
(BPCs), which were regarded as ineffective channels of political participation essentially
controlled by the regime. Not convinced by the efficacy of the political participation
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process and frightened that any expression of criticism would be severely punished,
numerous respondents withdrew from the BPCs entirely, accounting for the poor
attendance records (Obeidi, 2001; Al-Werfalli, 2011). Moreover, Al-Werfalli’s (2011)
study found that even those that attended the BPCs occasionally never participated in
debate. While Sharp (1973) acknowledges that under such conditions sufficient ‘loci of
power’ will be absent or limited in its effectiveness to wield independent action, Sharp
maintains that irrespective of these structural circumstances it is through overt
expressions of individual human agency that consent can be withdrawn to modify an
authoritarian regime’s sources of political power. In opposition to Sharp, Scott (1990)
argues that under systems of domination individuals will instead seek to covertly resist
an authoritarian regime where acts of anonymous resistance such as non-participation
enables a non-confrontational expression of opposition.

Political alienation from authoritarian regimes arises from an individual’s awareness that
the imposed political system is obstructive to the achievement of their goals and political
expressions (Al-Werfalli, 2011). Thus where political participation is circumscribed and
forms of protest and resistance are blocked, alienation will manifest in disguised forms of
resistance such as desertion and false compliance to avoid direct confrontation with an
oppressive system (Al-Werfalli, 2011). This corresponds with Scott’s (1990) assertion
that there will always be an ambiguous or coded version of the subordinate groups’
private transcript in the public transcript providing terrain on which to discover
resistance. Al-Werfalli (2011) hypothesised that the respondents’ withdrawal from BPC
participation was indicative of political alienation and an expression of non-compliance.
This was supported as most respondents indicated that instead of airing grievances in the
BPCs, their chosen channels of political resistance were either to talk privately with
trusted individuals or to remain silent 55 (Al-Werfalli, 2011). Political alienation leads to a
sense of powerlessness whereby people believe the choices available to them are
irrelevant or are in fact non-choices, so no matter what the individual does they feel
powerless to have any impact (Al-Werfalli, 2011). Where individuals are denied their
legitimate rights over an extended period a state of powerlessness is created, leading to
apathy and accompanying feelings of impotence and aggression, with violence the
predicable end result (May, 1972). “Violence arises not out of superfluity of power but
out of powerlessness” (May, 1972, p. 23).
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See Appendix C for the results of Al-Werfalli’s study on the methods of expressing disapproval.

53

Given many Libyans were left powerless in a political system that stifled opinion and
suppressed dissent, and with a remarkable number of respondents in Al-Werfalli’s (2011)
research declaring their support for violence to change the system, it is unsurprising that
the 2011 uprising could not be resolved through nonviolent action. Despite Sharp’s
assumption that consent (whether freely given or induced through intimidation) is the
basis of political power, the reality of Libya provides evidence that consent is a far more
complex phenomenon meaning Sharp’s theory will be limited. Apparent consent
(characterized behaviourally by either overt support or passive support) in the public
transcript can in fact disguise covert resistance (ideological opposition) in the private
transcript, where if sustained for a long duration will breed tendencies toward violence.
Thus as Scott asserts subordinate groups have not consented to domination, which is
evidenced through the everyday forms of resistance of their private transcript injected
into the public transcript.

Youth and violence
That the 2011 Libyan uprising and other Arab Spring revolutions were initiated by
disaffected youth is somewhat expected given younger people are more often at the
forefront of movements for social and political change (CSM, 24 February 2011). In
Libya younger people have historically proven an anti-regime source, evidenced after the
1975 RCC coup attempt when university student uprisings started in Benghazi and
Tripoli, in which the killing of ten anti-Qadhafi student’s sparked further protests
(Bearman, 1986; Vandewalle, 1998). More recently, the rise of Islamic opposition
movements has been almost completely a youth phenomenon, with the anti-cartoon
protest already mentioned instigated by young people (Vandewalle, 1998; Al-Werfalli,
2011). In 1990, 65 percent of Libya’s population was under twenty-five years of age,
with the 15-24 demographic accounting for 867,000 of the total population, making
Libya a youthful country. In 2010, approximately 36 percent of the population were
under the age of 15 with only four percent over 65, exposing a significant generation gap
between the average Libyan and the ageing revolutionary regime (Obeidi, 2001; AlWerfalli, 2011). Thus the inability of the Qadhafi regime to accommodate the aspirations
of its youth and facilitate their entry as productive members of the economy would serve
to create lurking discontentment with explosive potential (Takeyh, 2000, p. 159).

Al-Werfalli’s (2011) study found that Libya’s youth were the most dissatisfied with their
circumstances and expressed acute alienation from the political system. When Al54

Werfalli (2011) asked respondents about the methods they would support to bring about
change, centring on the options of nonviolent or violent action, the prevailing view
among youthful respondents, falling into the 18-37 demographic, was a determined
support for violence. However, nobody in the 57-and-over age group supported violent
methods, largely advocating peaceful resistance. When elaborating on their support for
violence, youthful respondents regarded nonviolent means to be futile against an
intolerant regime and armed resistance the only effective course of action (Al-Werfalli,
2011).

Given the central role of Libya’s youth during the 2011 uprising and their predisposition
toward violence to effect change, it was unlikely that the uprising could be resolved
nonviolently. Libya’s youth serves as a ‘loci of power’ that has been continually
obstructed from overtly expressing their dissatisfaction with the revolutionary regime in
the public transcript. Thus, contrary to Sharp’s assertion that such a loci could provide a
source of nonviolent action, Libya’s youth instead became a source of violent opposition,
nurtured in their private transcript waiting to be unleashed into the public transcript as
evidenced during the 2011 Libyan revolution.
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Conclusion

The aim of this thesis has been to examine Libya’s political, economic and social
structures to determine the predominant source of the Qadhafi regime’s political power,
and thus elucidate an explanation regarding which factors precluded Sharp’s
consensually based strategy of nonviolent action succeeding in the 2011 Libyan
revolution. Through a detailed analysis of Libya’s history from the nineteenth century as
a traditional tribal society, to the monarchical period starting in 1951 when oil was
discovered and commercialised, through to the Qadhafi era from 1969 to 2011, a clear
picture of the internal dynamics of the Libyan system has emerged in which domination
served as the underlying source of the revolutionary regime’s political power. This has
highlighted that the longevity of Qadhafi’s regime is insufficient evidence to claim the
existence of political legitimacy based on Sharp’s ‘free’ consent or Gramsci’s
‘spontaneous’ consent and hegemony, but that it is rather more reasonable to conjecture
that the enduring nature of the regime was due to the constant application of force, which
procured the Libyan population’s acquiescence. Moreover, through detailed analysis of
Libya’s history and the events of the 2011 revolution it is evident that consent is a vastly
more complex phenomenon than asserted by Sharp, requiring a more integrated approach
for nonviolent action to become a viable strategy to effect regime change.

The structure-superstructure model of consensually based power as proposed by Gramsci
is a useful analytical instrument in highlighting the enduring nature of the tribe and Islam
as organic historical superstructures of consent within Libyan society (superstructures
abandoned by Qadhafi’s regime and instead used as weapons of resistance against
authoritarian rule). Additionally, Gramsci’s superstructure approach validates Sharp’s
assumption that intangible factors (psychological and ideological) can serve as sources of
consensually based political power. The strength of Gramsci’s theory has been in
identifying that consent is a variable phenomenon, which is procured at multiple levels.
While consent can be established at the economic base (structure) through the social
relations of the material and technical instruments of production this will be insufficient
for long-lasting consent and must go beyond the economic base to the superstructure (the
realm of ideologies within both civil and political society) for hegemony to be
established. Although Sharp also includes material resources as a source of consent,
unlike Gramsci he does not distinguish between the tiered platforms of economic and
ideological consensus, thus he does not adequately capture the full dynamics of political
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systems in which economic consent will only sustain authority for a finite period unless
accompanied by ideological mechanisms of consent.

Where consent is authentic, in Gramscian terms it originates as ‘spontaneous’ consent
before evolving into ideological consensus at the superstructural level, while for Sharp it
begins and remains as ‘free’ consent unless sanctions are involved (to be discussed next).
In this sense ‘authentic consent’ can either manifest as ‘overt/active consent’ at both the
behavioural and ideological level or as ‘passive consent’ (or more accurately
‘acquiescence’) expressed behaviourally as conformity, but will not involve consensus at
the ideological level. One explanation for the absence of ideological consent is that
individuals may not question the policies/ideologies of a regime if their current needs are
being satisfied. By tracing the history of Libya it has been shown that the tribe and Islam
as organic superstructures of consent provided the Sanusiya Order, the monarchy, and
initially Qadhafi, with the Libyan population’s behavioural and ideological consensus or
‘overt/active consent’. Behavioural conformity (‘passive consent/acquiescence’) was
established without ideological consensus, as was the case when Tripolitania united with
the Cyrenaican tribes while fighting Italian colonialism but did not ideologically consent
to the Sanusiya Order, and also when Qadhafi used economic wealth to initially garner
behavioural support – only after which he attempted to establish revolutionary
ideological consensus.

Incorporating Gramsci’s structure-superstructure framework with Scott’s public
transcript and private transcript theory has proven beneficial in determining whether
seeming hegemony in Libya’s public transcript is ‘authentic consent’ or if it conceals
resistance to domination in the population’s private transcript. Contrary to Sharp’s
assertion that ‘intimidated’ consent through the use of sanctions remains the basis of
consensual power (Sharp considers that an individual’s choice to be obedient despite
sanctions is indicative of consent, which differs from the notion of domination where
‘real’ choice is absent and is replaced with acquiescence through the use of coercion),
Gramsci argues that where ‘spontaneous’ consent declines or where genuine hegemony
has not been established the state will resort to rule through domination. Similarly, in
Scott’s terms apparent behavioural conformity in the public transcript can disguise
‘covert/passive resistance’ to domination in the private transcript of subordinate groups –
manifest as ideological opposition or as anonymous acts of behavioural resistance
injected into the public transcript. Through the examination of Libya under Qadhafi’s
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revolutionary regime it has become evident that while the Libyan leader initially
established what Sharp terms ‘free’ consent through intangible factors such as personal
charisma and Islam, and distribution of material resources, when Qadhafi arbitrarily
imposed his revolutionary political system he immediately alienated the majority of
Libyans, abandoned organic superstructures of consent, and instead employed
domination to enforce behavioural conformity and revolutionary legitimacy.

However, the Libyan population’s response to domination continued to support a picture
of apparent hegemony in the public transcript. ‘Overt/active consent’ was seemingly
embodied in the regime’s most ardent adherents, the revolutionary committees (RCs)
(although Al-Werfalli’s 2011 study argued this was often opportunistic behaviour rather
than ‘authentic ideological consent’). Meanwhile ‘passive consent/acquiescence’ was
manifest in the population’s acceptance of the regime’s economic rewards, with
negligible ‘overt/active resistance’, apart from Islamic opposition groups that were
quickly suppressed (and thus removed from the public transcript). However, AlWerfalli’s 2011 research challenged the image of the public transcript’s ‘authentic
consent’, demonstrating that acts of ‘covert/passive resistance’ continued in the
population’s private transcript. Research participants described choosing to talk privately
with trusted friends and/or remained silent as a means of behavioural and ideological
resistance, and that non-participation at the basic people’s congresses (BPCs) was a
behavioural manifestation of resistance – the injection of their private transcript into the
public transcript and evidence to counter that silence gives consent (those who did
participate at the BPCs did so out of fear from the threat of force confirming rule through
domination).

This evidence supports the notion that ‘authentic consent’ was not operating in Libya
under Qadhafi, but rather as Scott argues the majority of Libyans were resisting a system
of domination using disguised forms of resistance. Thus in Libya, the population could
not withdraw their consent in the way Sharp asserts (such as through labour strikes,
withdrawal from government employment or refusal to provide the government with
revenue voluntarily), as the regime was economically independent of the people through
exclusive access to vast oil revenues and foreign workers, with the population largely
reliant on the economic benefits of government employment for their day-to-day living.
While ‘authentic consent’ can serve as the basis of political power (evidenced through
the use of the tribe and Islam as organic superstructures of consent) this will not always
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be the reality. The longevity and seeming stability of the Libyan regime was not by
virtue of ‘authentic consent’ but was instead maintained through force and coercion.

Scott’s public-private transcript analysis was pivotal in elucidating that domination was
the Libyan regime’s primary source of political power, and that the majority of Libyans
were responding to domination through ‘covert/passive resistance’ – evident in a
sometimes overt form within the military, the tribes, and the Islamic opposition. Chapter
four discussed the multifarious historical and contemporary sources of violence in the
2011 Libyan uprising. Perhaps the most salient point is that ‘covert/passive resistance’
sustained for a long duration in a situation of powerlessness, where ‘real’ choices are
denied by the regime’s domination of all social structures, creates a state of apathy,
which is a breeding ground for violence. Thus it may be concluded that individuals who
live in a state of daily oppression in which their ‘covert/passive resistance’ is confined to
their private transcript where feelings of impotence and aggression are uprooted support
for the use of violence will be more predominant. Given Qadhafi’s willingness to use
military repression against the nonviolent protesters in the 2011 uprising (a perpetuation
of the revolutionary regime’s historical tactic of domination through violence) it was
even more probable that individuals in a constant state of ‘covert/passive resistance’
would retaliate with violence. Therefore, Sharp’s theory of consent upon which his
strategy of nonviolent action is based would seemingly be unsuitable within the Libyan
context.

In applying the theories of Sharp, Gramsci and Scott to the Libyan context it has been
demonstrated that in reality consent is a far more complex and variable phenomenon than
articulated in Gene Sharp’s theory of consent, and that local conditions will therefore
impact the effectiveness of his nonviolent strategy. A limitation of Sharp’s theory is that
it assumes consent is always the basis of political power expressed either as ‘free’ or
‘intimidated’ consent. The Libyan situation suggests that consent is not a simple, linear
concept, but has behavioural and ideological manifestations, and can be procured through
enduring historical sources of consent or through arbitrary political institutions with more
limited lifespans. Additionally, while consent can seemingly provide evidence of
hegemony, it could in fact be masking domination as the source of political power, which
Sharp does not address.
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Moreover, as demonstrated in the Libyan context nonviolent action (as both a
behavioural and ideological concept) will only be a suitable weapon of resistance within
certain milieus. Circumstances in which nonviolent action could be instigated include
where ‘overt/active consent’ has become ‘overt/active resistance’ such as the defections
of Qadhafi’s inner circle during the 2011 uprising (or where opportunistic notions yield
to an ideological aversion of current conditions). Additionally, where ‘passive
consent/acquiescence’ is manifest, whereby apparent behavioural conformity could belie
ideological ambivalence or ambiguity providing terrain on which to introduce and
nurture nonviolent action toward supporting opposition to prevailing conditions – such as
where nonviolent methods of ‘overt/active resistance’ toward an oppressive state have
become the main target of an authoritarian regime and could benefit from support from a
wider section of the population which may not have ideologically considered the longterm consequences of the environment in which they live.

However, where ‘covert/passive resistance’ is the underlying context (and as such it is
more likely that domination has become the main source of political power) the strategy
of nonviolent action will not find many receptive adherents (given the probability that
attempts at ‘overt/active resistance’ have already been crushed) who out of their state of
powerlessness are more likely to have resolved that violent conflict is the only outcome.
While ‘passive consent/acquiescence’ and ‘covert/passive resistance’ will behaviourally
appear almost identical because the state represses any sign of overt resistance, it is in
determining the difference between these categories (to be discovered in the content of
their private transcript) that will elucidate whether consent or domination is present, and
therefore determine whether nonviolent action presents the most effective method
through which to effect political change. Moreover, where a state is independent of its
people’s labour and consent, as was the case in Libya, then withdrawing consent
nonviolently will not be sufficient to bring down the state.
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Appendix A – Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) from 1969 to 1975

Name

Region

Social background

Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi*

Middle

Lower

Educational
background
Military

Abd as-Salam Jallud*

South

Lower

Military

Muhammad al-Mugaryef***

East

Middle

Military

Bashir Hawadi**

South

Lower

Military

Abu Bakr Yunus Jabir*

East

Lower

Military

Al-Khuwaylidi al-Hamidi*

West

Lower

Military

Mustapha al-Kharubi*

West

Lower

Military

Omar al-Muhayshi**

West

Upper-Middle

Military

Mukhtar al-Gerwy***

West

Middle

Military

Abd al-Munim al-Huni***

West

Middle

Military

Muhammed Najm***

East

Middle

Military

Awad Hamza***

East

Lower

Military

*
**
***

The only politically active RCC members after 1975.
Lead the 1975 coup against Qadhafi.
Forced from the RCC as members of the pro-Muhayshi faction failed coup of
1975.

Source: Vandewalle (2008)
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Appendix B – Structure of People’s Authority System

QuickTime™ and a
decompressor
are needed to see this picture.

Source: Al-Qaddafi (1980)
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Appendix C – Methods of expressing disapproval (%)

Contact the administration body concerned
Contact the Leadership
Contact the revolutionary committee in the commune
Bring the matter to the BPC at a meeting
Bring the matter to the media
Talk in public places
Talk privately with trusted individuals
Keep silent
Other
Do not know

21.6
0.2
29.3
12.8
4.4
0.5
94.6
68.9
23.0
0.6

Source: Al-Werfalli (2011)
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